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Each year, approximately 100,000 police officers experience work-related 
occupational injuries, and more than 100 are killed on the job, in training accidents, 
routine operations, and emergency response. Many of these injuries and deaths are 
considered preventable. Although the law enforcement profession has recently begun to 
place an emphasis on safety, with the goal of reducing injuries and fatalities, no 
systematic or comprehensive approach to safety management exists to oversee and 
coordinate safety throughout organizations.  
This thesis uses best-practice research to examine the safety protocols, practices, 
and safety management systems implemented in other high-risk professions, such as the 
fire service, military, and private industry, to determine common components and 
effective strategies that may be applied to the law enforcement profession. Numerous 
issues were identified to include the lack of a systemic approach to safety management, 
lack of a national reporting system for accidents and injuries, lack of safety management 
training for officers and leadership, lack of safety regulations and standards in the 
profession, and a failure to dedicate personnel to managing safety in organizations. A 
recommendation is then offered for a model law-enforcement safety management 
framework that can be applied to agencies of any size, with the goal of reducing 
accidents, injuries, and fatalities in the profession. 
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Each year, more than 100 law enforcement officers are killed on the job in 
training accidents, operations, and emergency response.1 Fatalities, however, tell only 
part of the story. Although accurate statistics for police officer injuries do not exist, 
estimates indicate that “approximately 100,000 police officers experience occupational 
injuries or illnesses each year.”2 It is also believed that many of these injuries and deaths 
are preventable.3 
While the law enforcement profession has begun to place an emphasis on safety 
with the goal of reducing injuries and fatalities, the approach has focused narrowly on the 
development of programs in targeted high-risk areas, such as driving and health and 
wellness. These safety programs often operate independently and without coordination 
with other safety initiatives, and fail to incorporate dedicated and trained safety personnel 
to provide oversight on safety programs and practices. Unfortunately, this approach 
allows for gaps in safety management that lead to injuries and fatalities that could be 
prevented.  
With the goal of developing a framework for a comprehensive law-enforcement 
safety management system, analysis was conducted to identify the best safety programs, 
policies, and practices in private industry and government organizations. These programs 
and practices were evaluated for effectiveness, comprehensiveness, and applicability to 
the law enforcement profession.  
One of the complicating factors for this task is the absence of accurate data on law 
enforcement accidents and injuries, due largely to the lack of a reporting mandate within 
                                                 
1 Steven G. Brandl and Meghan S. Stroshine, “The Physical Hazards of Police Work Revisited,” 
Police Quarterly 15 (2012): 262–282. 
2 Tom La Tourrette, “Safety and Health Protection Efforts in the Police Service,” Police Chief June 
2011, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2403&issue_id=62011. 




the profession and the reluctance of many agencies to share information.4 Although 
national databases capture statistics on officers assaulted and killed in the line of duty, no 
such database exists for officer injuries.5 Accurate data on law enforcement accidents and 
injuries is needed to properly assess and understand the range, nature, and cause of 
officer-related injuries and fatalities across the policing profession, so that effective 
prevention strategies can be implemented.  
During the course of research, the author identified areas of high-risk in law 
enforcement that contribute to a large number of preventable injuries and fatalities in the 
profession. These areas include a strong sub-culture that supports a higher level of risk 
taking in operations; training exercises, especially scenario-based training involving use 
of force and defensive tactics; driving and traffic-related incidents, with the failure to 
wear seatbelts identified as a significant contributor; fatigue and complacency; and 
physical and emotional health and wellness.6  
Then, the safety programs, practices, and initiatives of law enforcement and other 
high-risk organizations were examined. Current law enforcement efforts include specific 
safety-related programs in targeted high-risk areas, such as traffic and vehicle operation 
programs, as well as myriad health and wellness initiatives, but indicate the lack of a 
systematic or comprehensive approach that is coordinated or supported through national 
efforts. In contrast to law enforcement efforts, an examination of the fire service and the 
military indicates a strong focus on safety with standards, regulations, and programs 
implemented and coordinated across the profession and through the various branches of 
the military. These organizations also place an emphasis on the mitigation of operational 
risk through validated programs such as crew resource management. The fire service 
further sets itself apart from law enforcement by the detailed collection of injury and 
                                                 
4 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Reducing Officer Injuries: Final Report. 
(Alexandria, VA: IACP, 2014). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Julia Hill et al., Making Officer Safety and Wellness Priority One: A Guide to Educational 
Campaigns (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014); La Tourrette, 
“Safety and Health Protection Efforts in the Police Service”; David Griffith, “Training Accidents,” Police 
37, no. 4 (2013), 47–51; Darrel Stephens, Mora L. Fiedler and Steven M. Edwards, OSW Group Annual 
Summary: Issues and Recommendations Discussed for Improving the Well-being of Police Officers 
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2012). 
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fatality data from various professional organizations. Safety programs in private industry 
reveal an emphasis on behavioral-based programs that focus attention on the unsafe 
behaviors of employees and place responsibility for workplace safety directly on the 
worker rather than on workplace conditions.7 Safety programs in private industry are also 
heavily influenced by federal regulations and standards imposed by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. 
Research findings indicate that numerous issues contribute to the number of 
preventable injuries and fatalities in the law enforcement profession. These include the 
following: 
• a failure to take a systems approach to safety management;  
• a lack of dedicated safety personnel to oversee high-risk operations and 
training environments;  
• a lack of education programs for senior management and rank and file 
officers on Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management; 
• a lack of a national mandate and reporting depository for injuries and 
accidents;  
• a lack of regulations and standards for safety across the profession; 
• a lack of a mandated and standardized after-action review format and 
process to capture and share lessons learned;   
• a failure to incorporate OHS as a discipline within law enforcement. 
To address the deficiencies found in managing law enforcement safety, a 
framework for a law-enforcement safety management system was developed and is 
offered as a flexible model that can be adapted to agencies of any size and implemented 
without significant cost or extra resources. Other recommendations to improve safety 
within the profession include the following: 
• the development of standardized OHS and risk management training for 
both senior leadership and rank and dedicated safety personnel;  
                                                 
7 James Frederick and Nancy Lessin, “Blame the Worker: The Rise of Behavioral-Based Safety 
Programs.” Multinational Monitor (2000): 10–17.  
 xviii 
• the development of a comprehensive, national survey regarding safety 
management practices across the profession;  
• the development of a national mandate and reporting depository for 
injuries and accidents;  
• and the development of a standardized format for after-action review 
reports (AARs) and training to conduct AAR processes. 
The vast number of independent law enforcement agencies across the country—
more than 18,000—poses a significant challenge to the development of a standardized 
approach to law enforcement safety. Police organizations operate independently, and 
priorities differ vastly for each agency amid political and budgetary concerns. Resources 
to develop and implement safety, health, and wellness programs is also a significant 
challenge in today’s economic climate of shrinking budgets, and the culture within law 
enforcement organizations contributes to a pattern of acceptable risk-taking that leads to 
repeated injuries and accidents. Although risks vary and not all injuries and fatalities can 
be prevented, law enforcement continues to experience problems in similar areas, 
suggesting that organizational culture plays a key role in failing to address safety-related 
deficiencies.   
Despite the challenges, agency leadership can immediately begin to institute 
cultural changes by placing a priority on safety in their organizations. The proposed law-
enforcement safety management framework offers a viable option for agencies to manage 
safety without adding significant resources, presenting a systematic approach to 
identifying hazards, and developing measures to control and mitigate risk. 
The high-risk environment and nature of work conducted by law enforcement 
officers demands a holistic and dedicated approach to safety in order to reduce injuries and 
fatalities throughout the profession. Meaningful improvements in safety will require 
significant change and collaboration across the profession, input from a broad spectrum of 
disciplines, and leadership and support from national law enforcement organizations. The 
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In October 2008, a large county police agency in Virginia was conducting a 
water-rescue training exercise at a local regional park. Numerous specialty units were 
participating, including the agency’s helicopter unit, marine patrol unit, and dive team, 
with support from the county fire and rescue department. The exercise scenario included 
an officer acting as a role player in distress, who was inserted in the water by the dive 
team for the purpose of being “rescued” by the helicopter crew. Soon after entering the 
water, the officer went underwater and became missing.  
An immediate search for the officer began by units who were present, followed by 
a massive response of resources involving approximately 50 mutual aid partners. After 
five days, the deceased officer was located underwater, near the location where he 
disappeared. Investigations into the training-related fatality attributed the accident to 
several lapses in safety protocols and safety violations committed by the agency 
conducting the exercise.1 
In December 2013, a sergeant from a county sheriff’s office in New Mexico 
arrived on the scene of a major highway incident to assist in managing a multi-vehicle 
crash scene on an interstate highway during severe weather conditions.2 A storm moving 
through the area had created icy road surfaces, gusting winds, and low visibility due to 
blowing snow. As a result, multiple vehicle accidents occurred at this site in close 
proximity to one another prior to the sergeant arriving.  
Six emergency units from different public safety agencies were on-scene along 
both sides of the divided roadway at the time of the incident. As the sergeant crossed the 
northbound lanes to confer with another officer, he was struck and killed by a passing 
vehicle that had lost control due to the icy conditions. 
                                                 
1 Personal knowledge of and involvement with this line-of-duty fatality incident. 
2 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), Sergeant Dies after Being Struck 
by a Motor Vehicle on Interstate Highway, New Mexico (Washington, DC: NLEOMF, 2014).  
 2 
An investigation identified several key contributing and controllable factors in the 
fatality: the need for increased traffic control resources; failure to implement the incident 
command system to evaluate the response activities, assess risk, and dedicate sufficient 
resources to control the scene; a failure of officers at the scene to wear high-visibility, 
reflective traffic vests; and the failure to develop pre-incident plans and standard 
operating procedures for deployment to low frequency/high risk highway incidents.3 
Incidents like these are not uncommon in the law enforcement profession. Despite 
recent advances in police officer safety, health, and wellness, preventable line-of-duty 
accidents resulting in injuries and fatalities continue to occur, leaving families and 
agencies devastated, and communities impacted. The purpose of this research is to 
recommend a comprehensive safety management framework for law enforcement that 
addresses safety across the entire organization, with the goal of mitigating risk and 
reducing the number of preventable injuries and fatalities across the profession.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, police officers have one of the 
highest rates of injury and illness of any occupation.4 It is estimated that each year over 
100 officers are killed on the job in training accidents, routine operations, and emergency 
response.5 Fatalities, however, only tell part of the story. Although precise statistics for 
police officer injuries are not available, “approximately 100,000 police officers 
experience work-related occupational injuries or illnesses each year.”6 It is also estimated 
that many of these injuries and deaths are preventable.7 Mora Feidler describes in Officer 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4  Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Police and Detectives,” accessed Aug. 21, 2015, http://www.bls.gov/
ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm. 
5 Steven G. Brandl and Meghan S. Stroshine, “The Physical Hazards of Police Work Revisited,” 
Police Quarterly 15 (2012), 262–282. 
6 Tom La Tourrette, “Safety and Health Protection Efforts in the Police Service,” Police Chief June 
2011, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2403&issue_id=62011. 




Safety and Wellness, that “from 2000–2009, a total of 728 officers were accidently killed 
due to events such as automobile, motorcycle or aircraft accidents; being struck by cars; 
shooting accidents; drowning or falling; or explosion or electrocution accidents.”8  
In addition to the physical impact to the officer(s) involved, line-of-duty fatalities 
and critical injuries often cause psychological trauma to officers and their agencies, 
leaving lasting effects that can affect professional reputations, and lead to officer 
suicides, criminal prosecution, and wrongful death or negligence lawsuits.9 The cost of 
defending, litigating, and resolving lawsuits often results in significant financial burdens 
on agencies, and further contributes to the emotional impact on individuals involved.10 
Law enforcement officers, in addition to their core mission of delivering effective 
police services to communities, also play a critical role as homeland responders in our 
nation’s ability to respond to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or pandemics effectively. 
Fatalities and injuries impair an agency’s readiness and preparedness to respond to these 
and other emergencies. Keeping officers safe from hazards faced in the law enforcement 
profession will enhance mission effectiveness and community safety. Although not all 
risk can be eliminated, improvements can be made by addressing the culture of safety in 
agencies, and developing a focused, systematic approach to safety in the policing 
profession. 
Accurate statistical data is needed to develop effective safety programs that 
address hazards in the profession, and reduce the rate of injuries and fatalities. Research 
indicates that accurate data on law enforcement accidents and injuries is currently non-
existent in the profession, due largely to the lack of a reporting mandate and the 
reluctance of many agencies to share information.11 Although national databases capture 
                                                 
8 Mora L. Feidler, Officer Safety and Wellness: An Overview of the Issues (Washington, DC: 
Community Oriented Policing Services [COPS], 2015).http://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/OSWG/e091120401-
OSWGReport.pdf. 
9 Thomas Connelly, “Perspective: Risk Management and Police Training,” FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, March 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/march/perspective-risk-management-and-police-training. 
10 Ibid. 
11 International Association of Chiefs of Police, (IACP) Reducing Officer Injuries: Final Report. 
(Alexandria, VA: IACP, 2014). 
 4 
statistics on officers assaulted and killed in the line of duty, no such database exists for 
officer accidents and injuries.12 There is also no comprehensive database that accurately 
captures lessons learned from these incidents, so that future accidents might be 
prevented.13  
Although the policing profession has more recently begun to place an emphasis 
on safety with the goal of reducing injuries and fatalities, the approach has narrowly 
focused on the development of programs in targeted high-risk areas such as driving, 
health, and wellness, and policy development.14 These safety programs operate 
independently and often without coordination with other safety initiatives, addressing 
problem-specific issues such as “mandatory wear” requirements for bulletproof vests and 
officer health and fitness, while ignoring other problem areas with an organization. 
Despite its value in addressing targeted high-risk behaviors, this approach has failed to 
incorporate a comprehensive framework that addresses all areas of risk within agencies, 
and fails to incorporate dedicated and trained safety personnel to provide expert and 
focused oversight on safety programs and practices. According to the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF), “less than half of U.S. states mandate that law enforcement 
agencies meet even basic occupational health and safety program components.”15 A 
review of the literature available on safety programs in law enforcement reveals a need 
for a comprehensive approach to safety within individual agencies, as well as a 
significant shift in organizational culture. 
The law enforcement profession may benefit from studying the safety protocols, 
practices, and safety management systems implemented in other high-risk professions 
such as the fire service, military, and private industry, with the goal of developing more 
effective programs that place a priority on safety and mitigate risk in the workplace. The 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Scott Brien and Stephen Fender, “Officer Safety Corner: National Data Collection: A Call to 
Action,” Police Chief, May 2012, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2661&issue_id=52012. 
14 Julia Hill et al., Making Officer Safety and Wellness Priority One: A Guide to Educational 
Campaigns (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014). 
15 Elizabeth L. Sanberg et al., A Guide to Occupational Health and Safety for Law Enforcement 
Executives (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2010). 
 5 
high-risk environment and nature of work conducted by law enforcement officers 
demands a holistic and dedicated approach to safety in order to reduce fatalities and 
injuries throughout the profession. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can an evaluation of workplace safety practices, policies, and programs in 
public safety, government organizations, and private industry, lead to the development of 
a model framework for a law-enforcement safety management system?  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides research into the current safety programs and 
organizational cultures in public safety organizations, the military, and private industry to 
identify smart practices or processes that can be used to develop the framework for an 
effective safety management system for the law enforcement profession. The objective is 
to identify core safety program components that are common in high-risk organizations, 
and apply a systems-thinking methodology to recommendations for a comprehensive 
safety management framework. The goal of implementing such a framework is to reduce 
the number of preventable injuries and fatalities across the profession. Information in this 
literature review has been organized into the following categories: 
• high-risk nature of policing,  
• gaps in data and programs, 
• why accidents happen, 
• safety culture and role of leadership,  
• safety programs in law enforcement, 
• safety programs in private industry, 
• safety programs in government organizations, and 
• systems thinking  
A. HIGH-RISK NATURE OF POLICING  
There is little dispute throughout the literature that policing is a dangerous 
profession. The range of risks and threats associated with a career in law enforcement are 
varied and change over time. Statistics from the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
and Assaulted (LEOKA) and National Law Enforcement Officer’s Memorial Fund 
(NLEOMF) databases indicate a “rise in the number of officers killed and assaulted in the 
line of duty over the past 10 years, especially by gunfire.”16 These two databases provide 
                                                 
16 “Law Enforcement Facts,” National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), 
accessed August 21, 2015, www.nleomf.org/facts.enforcement.  
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the only accurate data in the country on police officers killed and assaulted; however, to 
accurately assess the extent of the danger to the policing profession, and determine the 
areas of focus for safety programs, additional data is needed on accidents and injuries.17 
Categories of high-risk areas in policing have been consistently identified in 
research. These areas continue to be of concern for police executives due to the liability 
and risk associated with their potential outcomes. Examples include realistic scenario-
based training conducted in use-of-force classes, special operations training, firearms and 
active shooter training, and vehicle accidents, which typically comprise the largest 
category of line of duty deaths each year.18  
In addition to the physical hazards of the law enforcement profession, the high 
stress nature of the police work places officers at a greater risk for psychological 
problems such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which can cause depression, 
irritability, alcohol abuse, domestic problems, and heart-related issues. Annual rates for 
suicide among active and retired police officers are estimated to be above line-of-duty 
deaths, although studies vary widely in their findings on this issue.19 Complicating the 
psychological problems experienced by police officers, as with those serving in the 
military, is the cultural stigma many officers feel in seeking assistance for their problems 
and a concern of being labeled weak or unfit for duty.  
B. GAPS IN DATA AND PROGRAMS 
Research conducted in the area of officer-related injuries and fatalities reveals a 
significant gap in the need for more accurate data collection. Relevant data regarding law 
enforcement injuries and fatalities is not being collected, and is clearly documented 
throughout the literature and recognized by leaders in the policing profession. According 
to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), “the officer injury picture has 
been narrowly defined, with the majority of the focus on line-of-duty deaths and 
                                                 
17 IACP, Reducing Officer Injuries. 
18 “Law Enforcement Facts.” 
19  “By Their Own Hand: Suicide among Law Enforcement Personnel,” Community Policing 
Dispatch, April 2009, http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/April_2009/suicide.htm. 
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assaults.”20 Accurate data on police officer accidents and injuries, however, has been 
virtually non-existent.21  
Steven Brandl and Meghan Stroshine’s study on the physical hazards of police 
work indicates that there are significant problems associated with defining the danger of the 
policing profession strictly in terms of assaults and homicides, since (they argue) it 
“distorts the risk and severely underestimates the hazards involved.”22 The lack of accurate 
data also makes it difficult for police executives to address the range of risks faced and 
enact preventative measures.23 Their study further recognizes the need to research and 
measure the psychological effects to police officers after physical injuries are sustained.24 
To properly assess and understand the range, nature, and cause of officer-related 
injuries and fatalities across the policing profession, it is essential that data on all 
accidents and injuries be captured from law enforcement agencies nationwide. This need 
was recently recognized by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, which 
called for a nationwide repository for officer injuries in order to make effective 
recommendations on tactics, training, equipment, and policies.25 
In its 2014 report titled Reducing Officer Injuries, the IACP identifies three 
reasons why tracking all police-related injuries is important:  
(1) to determine the impact of costs such as lost wages, medical expenses and 
insurance claims, as well as productivity decreases;  
(2) to develop effective training and policies to prevent injuries; and  
(3) to gain a comprehensive understanding of the scope of all police-related 
injuries on a national level.26  
                                                 
20 IACP, Reducing Officer Injuries. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Steven G. Brandl and Meghan S. Stroshine, “Toward an Understanding of the Physical Hazards of 
Police Work,” Police Quarterly 6 (2003): 172–191. doi:10.1177/109861113006002003.  
23 Brandl and Stroshine, “Toward an Understanding,” 172–191. 
24 Ibid. 
25 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing. (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015). 
26 IACP, Reducing Officer Injuries. 
 10 
The development of effective safety programs is dependent on this knowledge 
and must incorporate identified trends and patterns of injuries and fatalities, and how 
they occurred. 
In addition to the lack of a comprehensive database to properly analyze officer 
injuries, research also reveals a lack of willingness on the part of law enforcement 
agencies to openly share lessons learned due to fear of reprisal or criticism.27 The use of 
after-action reviews (AARs) has been inconsistent and largely reserved for major 
incidents, and is not standardized or mandated in the profession. The AARs that are 
conducted often do not provide an honest depiction of the issues due to professional 
concerns over reputations and liability.28  
In 2013, the Police Foundation, an “independent, non-membership organization 
dedicated to improving policing through innovation and science,” developed an online 
near-miss reporting system for law enforcement officers that is modeled after the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) near-miss reporting program.29 The 
Internet-based program “encourages law enforcement personnel to share their near miss 
stories and lessons learned to shield other law enforcement personnel from accidents, 
injuries and fatalities, as well as to prevent other community crises from occurring.”30 
Information shared on the website is anonymous, secure, non-punitive, and confidential. 
Efforts such as these to capture valuable lessons are encouraging but are limited by the 
voluntary cooperation and honest reporting of participating law enforcement agencies. 
The Bureau of Justice Assistance’s (BJA) 2010 Guide to Occupational Health 
and Safety for Law-Enforcement Executives is the only professional source located during 
this literature review that identified the need for a comprehensive approach to 
occupational health and safety programs for law enforcement. The guide provides a 
                                                 
27 Police Foundation, “LEO Near Miss: Lessons Learned Become Lessons Applied,” accessed Nov. 
21, 2014. http://www.leonearmiss.org. 
28 Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy. “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, 
Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them.” Homeland Security Affairs II, July 2006, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/167. 
29 Police Foundation, “Home,” accessed Oct. 31, 2015, http://www.policefoundation.org.  
30 “LEO Near Miss.” 
 11 
framework for “identifying the basic program elements for creating new, or strengthening 
and maintaining existing, occupational health and safety programs for law enforcement 
agencies, regardless of the threat identified.”31 While this resource provides an excellent 
starting point for developing comprehensive state and local law enforcement safety 
programs, it fails to recommend the incorporation of dedicated safety officer resources to 
oversee officer health and safety, especially during training and response to high-risk 
incidents, or recommend an approach to train and certify specialized law enforcement 
safety officers. 
Although current safety programs can and have been effective in addressing 
specific targeted risks, they often operate independently or in isolation, failing to address 
safety in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. This can result in gaps regarding 
safety protocols within agencies. This was a key point in a 2010 report published by 
PERF and BJA, which stated, “the law enforcement field could significantly benefit from 
adopting a standardized and comprehensive approach to occupational health and 
safety.”32 Also missing from current law enforcement safety programs are performance 
measures to evaluate the effectiveness of those programs that do exist. Without measures 
and evaluations to determine whether existing programs are having a positive impact on 
safety, agency resources may be misdirected and/or programs eliminated from annual 
budgets. 
This literature review revealed that no comprehensive safety management system 
exists in the law enforcement profession, a system that addresses risk comprehensively in 
routine, training, and operational environments. Such a system includes practices such as 
a comprehensive assessment of risks and hazards in the workplace; investigation and 
analysis of accidents and incidents; implementation of safety-related policies and 
regulations; performance metrics and reporting mechanisms; and system audits to 
determine if control measures are being practiced. 
                                                 
31 Sanberg et al., A Guide to Occupational Health and Safety, 1–62. 
32 Ibid. 
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C. WHY ACCIDENTS HAPPEN  
The human does not change. During the period of recorded history, there 
is little evidence to indicate that man has changed in any major respect. 
Because the man does not change, the kinds of errors he commits remain 
constant. The errors that he will make can be predicted from the errors he 
has made. 
—Risk-management pioneer Archand Zeller33  
To effectively design and implement safety programs in the workplace, it is 
important to understand why accidents are occurring, from both an employee and process 
standpoint. As stated in the 2004 journal article “The Role of Leadership in Instilling a 
Culture of Safety,” “effective safety management and safety culture must be built on an 
understanding of the cause of unsafe acts within the workplace.”34 Two academic but 
opposing theories of safety management systems have been identified to explain why 
accidents and injuries occur in the workplace, one focusing on systems within the 
organization, the other on people, which emphasizes flexibility and learning.35 Although 
strongly linked to organizations that manage complex and dangerous technologies, such 
as the nuclear industry, understanding these concepts may assist law enforcement 
organizations in developing a comprehensive approach to implementing appropriate 
safety programs aimed at prevention. 
1. Normal Accident Theory 
Normal Accident Theory, developed in the 1980s by Yale sociologist Charles 
Perrow in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island nuclear tragedy, states that accidents are 
“normal” and are to be expected in some systems “characterized by interactive 
complexity and tight coupling among its components.”36 The theory is built on the 
                                                 
33 Gordon Graham, “Domestic Security 2015: Organizational Success and Leadership Challenges” 
(lecture handout, Fusion Center Leaders Program, Monterey, CA, 2015). 
34 Hirsch S. Ruchlin et al., “The Role of Leadership in Instilling a Culture of Safety: Lessons from the 
Literature,” Journal of Healthcare Management 49, (2004): 47–58; discussion 58–9. 
35 Ibid. 
36 J. H. Saleh et al., “Highlights from the Literature on Accident Causation and System Safety: Review 
of Major Ideas, Recent Contributions, and Challenges,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 
(2010): 1105–1116. 
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principles that people make mistakes and big accidents evolve from smaller events that 
spiral out of control.  
Normal Accident Theory emphasizes that minimizing errors rather than avoiding 
them completely should be the goal of organizations because not all problems can be 
anticipated, especially in high-risk organizations like policing where unexpected 
variables often factor into response.37 The key to improving safety and reducing injuries 
is to develop a thorough understanding of the precursors to accidents, and developing 
policies and programs to address them.38 This is equivalent to the process of risk 
assessment and what law enforcement expert Gordon Graham recognizes as identifying 
problems lying in wait.39  
Throughout history, law enforcement agencies have operated at both ends of the 
spectrum regarding the acceptance of injuries in the workplace. Traditionally, little 
priority was placed on developing policies and programs to keep officers safe. The 
culture of police organizations simply accepted the high-rate of injuries and fatalities as a 
hazard of the profession. Even today, with an emphasis on improved officer safety and 
wellness, “there is a tendency to accept injuries as part of the job and a reluctance to do 
the type of analysis required to learn from mistakes.”40  
More recently, law enforcement agencies have recognized the significant impact 
of injuries and fatalities to organizational performance and employee well-being, and 
some professional police organizations are stressing the need to adopt a zero tolerance 
policy toward officer injuries. While the former approach led to preventable gaps in 
safety identification and mitigation, the latter sets up an unrealistic goal of perfection that 
cannot be achieved in the profession.  
In private industry, zero-injury goals have long played a central role in workplace 
safety strategies. A dramatic shift has occurred over the past several years, however, as 
                                                 
37 Ruchlin et al., “The Role of Leadership in Instilling a Culture of Safety,: 47–58; discussion 58–9. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Graham, “Domestic Security 2015.” 
40 Darrel Stephens and Leonard Matarese, “The Necessary Truths about Police Safety,” Law and 
Order 61 (2013), 82–87. 
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industries have become concerned with the concept of zero-injury goals due to 
widespread underreporting of near-misses, accidents and injuries.41 Zero-injury goals 
foster fear and anxiety on the part of the employee rather than a positive environment 
where employees can learn valuable lessons from near-misses and mistakes.42 The 
adoption of a zero tolerance policy toward injuries actually interferes with the 
development of a positive safety culture and can lead to negative outcomes, such as 
employees underreporting safety concerns due to fear of discipline.  
Although not easily transferable or directly applicable to the policing profession, 
Normal Accident Theory provides a reasonable concept for law enforcement leaders to 
consider, given the inherent dangers of the profession, uncontrolled variables involved, 
and likelihood of injury from a variety of threats. Understanding that accidents, injuries, 
and fatalities may happen, learning from mistakes and close calls, and developing 
policies and programs that identify and minimize risks and hazards that do not unfairly 
punish employees, are necessary for improving the culture of safety within an agency. 
2. Swiss Cheese Theory 
Closely associated with Normal Accident Theory throughout literature, accidents 
are also described as occurring due to “holes in defenses.”43 The Swiss Cheese Theory, 
developed in the 1990s by Manchester University professor James Reason, states that  
although most defenses function as designed, they are more like slices of 
Swiss cheese, having many holes— though unlike the cheese, these holes 
are continually opening, shutting, and shifting their location. The presence 
of holes in any one “slice” does not normally cause a bad outcome. 
Usually, this can only happen when holes in many layers momentarily line 
up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity—bringing hazards into 
damaging contact with victims.44 
                                                 
41 Scott Merilatt, “How to Motivate Employees through the Language of Workplace Safety,” EHS 
Today, June 1, 2015. 
42 Merilatt, “How to Motivate.” 
43 Ruchlin et al., “The Role of Leadership, 47–58; discussion 58–9.  
44 Ibid. 
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The theory states that these holes occur through both active failures and latent 
conditions. Active failures are described as the conscious, unsafe acts employees commit 
while working, such as police officers who disregard a mandatory wear policy for 
seatbelts or bullet-proof vests, or drive too fast and without due regard for safety during 
response to emergency calls.  
Latent conditions exist within an organizational system and arise through 
decisions, policies, and procedures created by management.45 Examples of a latent 
condition in policing can be found in an agency’s vehicle operations policy that does not 
provide repercussions for or restrictions on unacceptable driving behaviors. Such “latent 
conditions often lie dormant for many years before they combine with active failures 
resulting in accidents.”46 When this occurs, organizations must look at both the employee 
and the system for causation, mitigation, and future prevention. Figure 1 illustrates 
Reason’s Swiss-Cheese theory of accident causation. 
Figure 1.  Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation 
 
Source: Daniel Shouhed, Bruce Gewertz, Doug Wiegmann, and Ken Catchpole, 
“Integrating Human Factors Research and Surgery,” JAMA Surgery 147 (2012): 2. 




The concept of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Theory has similarity to one posed by 
Gordon Graham, an expert on risk management in law enforcement. Graham describes 
accidents as occurring due to both a proximate cause and problems lying in wait.47 
Graham explains that often organizations attempt to assign blame on the specific 
incidents or behaviors that instantly precede the accident, known as the proximate cause. 
An example of a proximate cause would be an officer that injuries a knee during 
defensive tactics training. Problems lying in wait are conditions in the organization that 
people knew or should have known about, but failed to act on. They are considered 
predictive, foreseeable conditions. In this scenario, the officer’s injury occurred on a hard 
surface, where training was being conducted without protective mats. The accident then 
is the result of a combination of the proximate cause (officer injures knee in training) 
with problems lying in wait (inadequate training equipment).48 Prevention can occur only 
by developing control measures, such as policies and procedures, to address those 
problems lying in wait and prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.49 
3. High-Reliability Organization Theory 
The High-Reliability Organization (HRO) viewpoint was developed through 
research conducted by a University of California-Berkley group from a field study 
“analyzing the factors leading to safe operations in high-risk organizations such as 
nuclear power plants, aircraft carrier flight decks, and air traffic control centers in the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).”50 These High-Reliability Organizations 
(HROs) “are characterized by placing a high cultural value on safety, effective use of 
redundancy, flexible and decentralized operational decision making, and a continuous 
learning and questioning attitude.”51 
                                                 
47 Gordon Graham, “American Law Enforcement 2015: Risk Management for Executives in Virginia 
Law Enforcement,” presented at the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police (VACP) Annual Conference 
at The Williamsburg Lodge in Williamsburg, VA, Aug. 30–Sept. 2.  
48 Graham, “American Law Enforcement 2015.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 R. Bruce Matthews, Safety Management of Complex, High-Hazard Organizations (Washington, 
DC: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 2004). 
51 Matthews, Safety Management. 
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Advocates of the high-reliability viewpoint conclude that the implementation of 
certain key attributes by management plays an important role in reducing the likelihood 
of accidents.52  
HROs are said to be characterized by employees displaying a high level of 
technical competence; flexible decision-making processes; sustained 
performance; processes that reward the discovery and reporting of errors; 
equal value placed on reliable production and operational safety; and a 
sustaining institutional culture.53 
Safety is often not the primary goal of organizations, as other business or 
organizational goals, such as timely production or rapid service, are often “best achieved 
in ways that are not consistent with operating at low risk,” which can slow production 
processes or delay service delivery.54 In policing, the goal or mission is to provide rapid 
and effective service and protection of the community. Officers typically perform their 
jobs in a productive manner, but often compromise personal safety in the process, taking 
unnecessary risks even when it is unnecessary or inappropriate to do so. In contrast, 
leaders in high-reliability organizations, place a priority on both performance and safety 
as organizational goals through the institution of various safeguards and policies.55  
Critics of the HRO Theory argue that the balance between performance and safety 
is not easily accomplished in some organizations, due to outside pressures for 
performance and goal achievement, impacting priorities that overshadow the need for 
rigid policies to ensure safety. Internal and external demands to get the job done can 
create a negative culture that compromises safety and increases the risk for accidents. In 
the policing profession, the goal of responding quickly to an incident often conflicts with 
the goal of arriving safety. Determining how to measure risk and setting standards for 
what is considered acceptable risk within an agency is critical to defining safety 
protocols.  
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Karen Marais, Nicolas Dulac and Nancy Leveson, “Beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability 
Organizations: The Need for an Alternative Approach to Safety in Complex Systems,” paper presented at 
Engineering Systems Division Symposium, MIT, Cambridge, MA, March 29–31, 2004. 
55 Marais, Dulac and Leveson, “Beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability Organizations.” 
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Although both Normal Accident and High-Reliability Organization Theories pose 
somewhat divergent viewpoints, both stress the importance of a strong safety 
management system and active involvement from leadership within the organization to 
reduce the risk of accidents and injuries.56 Understanding these theoretical concepts, as 
well as other models of accident causation posed by Reason and Graham, can assist law 
enforcement leaders in assessing organizational problems and developing prevention 
programs to mitigate risk. 
D. SAFETY CULTURE AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 
Throughout the body of literature on occupational safety in the workplace, a 
positive safety culture has been identified as the most critical component for the success 
of any safety program in high-risk organizations. Leadership support and effective 
modeling of safety behaviors and practices are also identified as necessary to achieve a 
positive safety culture in the workplace. 
No single, universally accepted definition for safety culture exists, although most 
definitions located share similar characteristics. Kim Sloat’s definition is widely 
recognized in safety culture literature and states that the safety culture of an organization 
is the artifacts (things and written procedures), values (values, philosophies, goals and 
standards), and assumptions (unconscious beliefs of organizational culture) that people 
hold in common.57 When discussing why safety programs fail, Sloat points out that the 
majority of safety programs involve changes solely at the artifact level. To make lasting 
change within an organization, efforts must also be consistent with the values or 
assumptions of the organization, or include ways to change them.58 
This is often evident in safety initiatives implemented in the law enforcement 
profession, where changes in written policies, regulations, and general orders alone often 
do not produce the changes in behavior intended by the directives. An example of this 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Kim C. Sloat, “Why Safety Programs Fail ... and What to Do about It,” Occupational Hazards 58 
(1996): 65–72. 
58 Sloat, “Why Safety Programs Fail,” 65–72. 
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can be seen in the lack of seat belt use throughout the profession. Despite state laws and 
agency regulations in existence, lack of seat belt use continues to pose a significant safety 
problem for law enforcement. Agencies that have improved seat belt usage have not only 
created directives to mandate their use, but also have conducted educational campaigns to 
encourage officer usage, and random checks and audits to gauge compliance and hold 
officers accountable. 
Research shows that both in the policing profession and in private industry, the 
success of workplace safety programs is dependent on engaged and supportive leadership 
that places a priority on safety within an organization.59 Employees are more likely to 
adopt and adhere to safety practices and procedures if leaders model these same 
behaviors within their organizations.60 In addition to refining practices and protocols to 
improve safety, leaders at all levels within organizations must take a greater role in 
mitigating risk and exposure and creating a culture of safety. E. Kevin Kelloway, Jane 
Mullen and Lori Francis state in “Divergent Effects of Transformational and Passive 
Leadership on Employee Safety” that “when leaders actively promote safety, 
organizations experience better safety records and more positive safety outcomes.”61 A 
study on patterns of root cause in workplace injury conducted by Dodge indicated that 
leadership recognition and acceptance of their role in safety emerged as the single most 
important element in injury prevention.62 
As pointed out in the COPS publication Making Officer Safety and Wellness 
Priority Number One, despite the clear and important distinctions between policing and 
other professions, “core values that drive organizational life are at the heart of building a 
strong culture, whether the organization is an online retailer, manufacturing plant, or law 
enforcement agency.”63 It can be argued that developing and maintaining a strong 
                                                 
59 E. Kevin Kelloway, Jane Mullen and Lori Francis, “Divergent Effects of Transformational and 
Passive Leadership on Employee Safety,” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 11 (2006): 76–86. 
60 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force. 
61 Ibid. 
62 R. Bruce Dodge, “Patterns of Root Cause in Workplace Injury,” International Journal of Workplace 
Health Management 5 (2012), 31–43. 
63 Hill et al., Making Officer Safety and Wellness Priority One, 1–72. 
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organizational culture that places an emphasis on safety is even more critical in law 
enforcement due to the variety of risks police officers face on a daily basis. 
Establishing a culture of safety in law enforcement is the primary responsibility of 
police leadership, whose task it is to set priorities and ensure a consistent focus on safety-
related issues. Rosa Antonia Carrillo indicates that “one of the strongest barriers to buy-in 
for safety efforts is a perceived lack of management commitment.”64 According to 
Thomas Krause and Thomas Weekley, “one of the more fundamental roles of leadership 
in organizations relating to safety is enabling hazard elimination and control.”65 Leaders 
must “establish an environment and a process where hazards are routinely examined to 
verify that the most effective and practical controls are applied” to reduce risk and 
exposure.66 Heather Dilley and Brian Kleiner point out that cultural change takes time 
and must be approached in a systematic manner, instituting incremental changes over 
time. They also state that “it takes one to five years to change a culture so that safe 
behavior becomes second nature.”67 
Numerous cultural barriers to safety exist in the law enforcement profession and 
include the feeling of invincibility, the need to demonstrate toughness in realistic 
scenario-based training, the expectation to arrive quickly to emergency incidents, and the 
failure to seek mental health care due to the stigma of being labeled weak or unfit for 
duty. Officers are often conditioned through organizational culture to engage in these 
high-risk behaviors and put service over sacrifice. Establishing a positive safety culture 
requires an engaged leadership that not only sets safety policy and practices, but also 
models and reinforces them. 
                                                 
64 Rosa Antonia Carrillo, “Safety Leadership: Managing the Paradox,” Professional Safety (2005): 31–
34. 
65 Thomas R. Krause and Thomas Weekley, “Safety Leadership: A Four-Factor Model for 
Establishing a High-Functioning Organization,” Professional Safety (2005): 34–40. 
66 Krause and Weekley, “Safety Leadership,” 34–40. 
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E. SAFETY PROGRAMS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Over the past 10 years, a wide array of safety-related programs and initiatives 
have been developed in the policing profession for the purpose of reducing the number of 
officer related injuries and fatalities. Many of the programs, initiatives, and educational 
campaigns have developed through federal and national level law enforcement 
professional organizations such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the Major City Chiefs 
Association (MCC), and the National Law Enforcement Officer’s Memorial Fund 
(NLEOMF). 
The BJA’s Preventing Violence Against Law Enforcement and Ensuring Officer 
Resilience and Survivability (VALOR) Program is one such initiative that “assists law 
enforcement officers in responding to the increase in ambush-style assaults.”68 Through 
the VALOR Program, “officers receive training and technical assistance as well as 
detailed analyses of past attacks.”69 These encounters are examined through lessons 
learned and after-action reviews that are available through in person or web-based 
training seminars.70 
In response to the increasing number of officers killed by gunfire in the past 10 
years, “the Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program was developed by the BJA to 
assist law enforcement agencies in acquiring soft body armor for their personnel.”71 
Research shows that “body armor has saved the lives of more than 3,000 officers when 
they encountered a life-threatening situation.”72 Funds are provided to state and local 
jurisdictions by the BJA to assist in purchasing protective vests when agencies agree to 
adopt mandatory body armor wear policies for their officers. Attaching the award of grant 
                                                 
68 “What Is Valor,” VALOR, accessed June 21, 2015, http://www.valorforblue.org/Home/About. 
69 “What Is Valor.” 
70 Ibid. 
71 Darrel Stephens, Mora L. Fiedler and Steven M. Edwards, OSW Group Annual Summary: Issues 
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funding to mandatory body armor wear policies has increased the use of body armor 
nationwide.73 
Below 100 is a national safety program that was developed by a group of 
dedicated law enforcement trainers to target areas of risk in the profession that were 
considered within an officer’s control, and in areas of the profession where a high 
number of line of duty deaths were occurring, such as response driving.74 The course was 
developed after instructors reviewed thousands of line-of-duty death summaries and 
noticed trends in specific areas, and determined that many of these fatalities were 
preventable. The Below 100 program has evolved over time and is now managed by a 
non-profit organization that provides training to law enforcement agencies nationwide, 
with the goal of increasing safety and mitigating risk in areas where a large number of 
accidents and injuries are occurring. 
In addition to dangers surrounding operation response, an increasing area for risk 
of injury or death in policing involves accidents during training. With advancements in 
technology, police trainers have developed more interactive and realistic training 
scenarios to better prepare officers for violent, physical encounters and develop strategies 
to de-escalate use of force incidents. With the increase in realism has come an increase in 
training injuries and fatalities.75 The vast majority of police training accidents occur in 
defensive tactics and force on force classes.76 The existence of a cultural attitude 
throughout law enforcement that training during force on force classes must be carried 
out in a manner to “toughen up” officers often leads to a lack of effective safety controls 
and injuries.77 This has led to the development of the Training Safety Officer (TSO) 
Program. 
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The TSO Program is a proactive effort to reduce training injuries and accidents by 
assigning a TSO to oversee the safety of the training session.78 TSOs incorporate risk 
assessments, safety plans, safety briefings, inspections, and debriefing sessions into 
training exercises. TSOs are not involved in the actual training, but work closely with the 
instructional staff to deliver effective and safe training outcomes. Research from the 
IACP’s study Reducing Officer Injuries supports the reduction of injuries in scenario-
based training with the adoption of these practices, especially during training on arrest 
procedures and the use of force. Despite these findings, many law enforcement agencies 
do not incorporate formal TSO Programs into their training practices.79  
Examples of various safety programs that targeted specific police safety issues 
were discovered throughout this literature review. These programs were largely 
educational in nature such as LAPD’s campaign to gain officer compliance on their 
policy regarding mandated seatbelt usage; Arlington (TX) Police’s educational efforts 
and outreach to reduce agency accidents from distracted driving; and the Prince George’s 
County (MD) Police’s efforts to eliminate preventable traffic-related fatalities among its 
ranks by encouraging slower response driving and seatbelt use.80 Other police safety 
programs exhibited by various agencies include respiratory protection programs, 
programs to control and manage exposure to bloodborne pathogens, physical fitness, and 
stress management programs. 
Lastly, advances in technology have contributed to officer safety efforts through 
the development of less lethal technology. Implementation of tools such as electronic 
control devices, more commonly known as Tasers, have enabled officers to effectively 
control and subdue violent subjects without having to engage in a physical confrontation. 
This has reduced injuries to officers and subjects being placed under arrest or detained 
when individuals exhibit emotional instability requiring intervention. Advances in 
personal protective equipment, such as ballistic shields, respirators, chemical protective 
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suits, have also provided enhanced protection for officers during violent encounters and 
exposure to communicative disease. Not all law enforcement agencies, however, have 
access to or have adopted these tools due to budgetary constraints or political restrictions. 
F. SAFETY PROGRAMS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
Different approaches to workplace safety have been proposed within private 
industry, and serve as important organizational components in the manufacturing, 
chemical, and nuclear sectors. Often the emphasis is on behavior-based safety programs, 
which focus on the worker rather than working conditions.81 James Frederick and Nancy 
Lessin describe behavior-based safety programs as those that “focus attention on worker 
carelessness and conscious or unconscious unsafe behaviors, and place the onus for a safe 
workplace on workers themselves.”82 
Although behavior-based safety programs were developed to achieve effective 
outcomes, opponents argue that the true incentive behind behavior-based safety programs 
is to discourage employees from reporting injuries in the workplace.83 Research indicates 
that behavior-based safety programs have created environments of fear among employees 
who properly report unsafe behavior, fearing blame and reprisal from colleagues and 
management.84 According to Frederick and Lessin, “peer pressure and pressure from 
management” to hide injuries and accidents contributes to the problem, “leaving health 
and safety problems untreated and underlying hazards uncorrected.”85 These programs 
often include incentives and prizes for not reporting injuries, and threaten discipline or 
other disincentives for those that do. 
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Incentive programs are similar to behavioral-based safety programs and can have 
similar unintended consequences for organizations if not managed properly.86 Marc 
Resnick states that incentives can come in the form of extrinsic or intrinsic motivators.87 
Extrinsic motivators are best described as physical rewards such as bonuses, vacation 
days, or gift certificates. Extrinsic incentives can cause employees to hide accidents or 
misrepresent their performance.88 Intrinsic motivators, conversely, are those that “have 
no explicit value but are linked directly to the personal need to be appreciated.”89 
Examples include publicly praising an individual for good work or an award for safe 
employee of the month. Research has shown that intrinsic rewards are more effective in 
embedding safety into the culture of an organization, thereby fostering a greater level of 
cooperation among employees.90 
From a safety regulation standpoint, what sets private industry and the federal 
government apart from state and local government is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970. The Act is the primary federal law created to establish and enforce a broad 
range of occupational health and safety standards to protect American workers.91 The Act 
created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), whose jurisdiction 
is limited to private industry and federal agencies and does not apply to state and local 
government workers.92 Federal legislation, however, allows states to establish their own 
OSHA programs. State programs that are enacted must cover state and local government 
workers, and the regulations must be as stringent as those of OSHA.93 OSHA monitors 
the effectiveness of all state programs to ensure compliance. 
                                                 











States that have enacted OSHA programs have regulations that apply to state and 
local law enforcement agencies. Public safety generally falls into the general industry 
category, which includes mandates regarding personal protective equipment, respiratory 
protection, bloodborne pathogens, and the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response standard.94 Law enforcement agencies must develop a comprehensive 
understanding of these state OSHA regulations to increase safety protocols and ensure 
compliance. 
G. SAFETY PROGRAMS IN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS  
Fire departments across the country adhere to the most comprehensive and 
standardized approaches to workplace safety programs in the public safety field. They 
utilize dedicated fire safety officers to oversee the safety of personnel during training and 
high-risk operations, as well as routine tasks throughout the organization.95 The 
importance of the Health and Safety Officer and Incident Safety Officer has long played 
an integral role in the fire service. The role of safety officer is considered so critical in 
operations that the fire service is now considering moving toward mandatory nationwide 
certification.96 Fire safety officers receive standardized training and certification through 
the Fire Department Safety Officers Association (FDSOA), a non-profit professional 
organization whose mission is “to promote safety standards and practices in the fire and 
rescue community.”97 
The fire service also established national standards through the National Fire 
Protection Agency (NFPA), another “nonprofit organization established to reduce death, 
injury and property loss due to fire or electrical hazards.”98 NFPA Standard 1500 
specifically required organizations within the fire service to “adopt occupational health 
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and safety programs designed to prevent injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.”99 The fire 
service has also developed numerous programs to assist in evaluating firefighter injuries 
and fatalities, such as the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. This 
program federally mandates the investigation of firefighter deaths to determine the cause 
and assist in the prevention of future incidents.100 Law enforcement agencies’ injury and 
fatality reporting mandates do not compare in scope or detail to those in the fire service. 
The law enforcement profession could benefit from studying the comprehensive and 
proactive approach to workplace safety of their public safety fire counterparts. 
The fire service has developed a variety of other safety initiates and projects to 
reduce injuries and fatalities in the workplace. The Near Miss Project, sponsored by the 
IACF, was developed to “share lessons learned about incidents of injury producing 
behavior.”101 Based on a the system developed by the aviation industry that improved the 
safety record for air travel, the Near Miss Project is intended to better identify small 
errors before they can lead to accidents.102 The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation 
developed 16 Firefighter Safety Initiatives to improve the safety culture in the fire 
service.103 These initiatives are listed on a website developed by the organization titled 
“Everyone Goes Home” and cover topics such as cultural change, risk management, 
response policies, fatality and near-miss investigations, and medical and physical 
fitness.104 
Due to many similarities between law enforcement and the military regarding 
operations and training in high-risk and rapidly evolving environments, an examination 
of military safety programs was conducted. Research indicates that the U.S. Army has 
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taken a holistic approach to safety through both regulations and processes to guide 
behavior and manage risk. The Army Safety Program is a comprehensive manual of 
regulations and directives that addresses safety throughout the U.S. Army. The 
introduction to the manual prescribes “Department of the Army (DA) policy, 
responsibilities, and procedures to safeguard and preserve Army resources worldwide, to 
include Soldiers, Army civilians, and Army property against accidental loss.”105 This 
detailed safety manual covers Army operations, training, and routine day-to-day 
functions across the entire organization. 
The Army establishes composite risk management (CRM), also known as crew 
resource management, “as the Army’s principal risk reduction methodology and assures 
regulatory and statutory compliance.”106 CRM, also utilized by other branches within the 
military and by the aviation industry, is intended “to minimize the effect that human error 
has on operations and enhance human performance.”107 CRM is “the process used by 
crew members to identify existing and potential threats and to develop, communicate and 
implement plans and actions to avoid or mitigate perceived threats.”108 Airplane crews 
began using CRM methods in order to avoid, manage, and mitigate human errors.109 
CRM programs were also found to improve crew morale and enhance operational 
efficiency.110 CRM has more recently been adopted by the fire service to enhance 
decision-making and reduce the number of line-of-duty injuries and fatalities. 
Operational Risk Management (ORM), a related process used heavily by the U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and by the aviation industry, is a risk management and decision-
making tool for reducing the inherent risk in conducting military and flight operations 
and increasing operational effectiveness. The intent of ORM is to balance risk and 
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mission completion in all operations. The process involves six steps: identify hazards, 
assess risk, analyze control measures, make control decisions, implement risk controls, 
and supervise and review the controls once in place to ensure of their continued 
effectiveness.111 The ORM process is also recommended by Gordan Graham to mitigate 
risk and enhance organizational performance in law enforcement agencies. 
After-action reviews (AARs), a critical component of military safety programs, 
were first developed by the United States Army in the 1970s to provide detailed feedback 
to units on individual and collective performance and their relation to combat 
outcomes.112 In addition to a detailed analysis of combat outcomes and unit performance, 
the AAR also included the identification of safety-related issues and areas that deserved 
special attention for training.113 The purpose was to sustain unit strengths and improve 
weaknesses in preparation for future response. The AAR is intended to be a method for 
teams to “reflect on and learn while performing.”114 Its goals are to “understand why 
interim objectives were not accomplished, what safety and performance lessons can be 
learned, and how those lessons can be quickly driven back into the performance 
process.”115  
H. SYSTEMS THINKING  
To understand the concept of systems thinking, it is important to understand what 
constitutes a system. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a system as “a group of 
related parts that move or work together; a regularly interacting or interdependent group 
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of items forming a unified whole.”116 As defined by the Oxford Dictionary, a system is 
“a set of connected things or parts forming a complex whole.”117  
The term “systems thinking” was first used in 1987 by Barry Richmond, a well-
known leader in the field of systems dynamics.118 This “systems approach concentrates 
on the analysis and design of the whole as distinct from the parts.”119 Characteristics of 
systems thinking involve “long term planning, feedback loops between various 
components, and collaborative planning across all areas of an organization.”120 Systems 
thinking is considered most effective on difficult problems such as “those involving 
complex issues; those that depend a great deal on the past or on the actions of others; and 
those stemming from ineffective coordination among those involved.”121 Utilizing a 
systems approach to understanding why accidents happen allows a more in depth analysis 
of accident causation by examining the interrelationships among the various components 
in the system.122  
According to law-enforcement risk management expert Graham, “adequate 
systems are necessary in organizations so that issues of importance can be recognized and 
prioritized.”123 This includes systems to manage risk and safety across the organization. 
Graham states that “organizational risk management, or the management of the overall 
risks within an organization, and operational risk management, or the management of the 
risk of a specific incident, involve the proper development and full implementation of 
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systems.124 Graham further states that almost all successful organizations are 
organizations committed to systems.”125 
According to Karen Marais, Nicolas Dulac and Nancy Leveson, “a systems 
approach to safety recognizes that safety is a property of the system as a whole, not a 
property of individual system components.”126 They further explain that “a systems 
approach takes a broader view of what went wrong with the organization to allow the 
accident to take place.”127 As pointed out by Aronson, “the systems thinking approach 
contrasts with traditional analysis, which studies systems by breaking them down into 
separate elements.”128 This fact suggests that law enforcement organizations should alter 
the way in which they currently address safety problems, taking a broader, systematic 
view of organizational safety as opposed to the traditional view of addressing safety 
solely in terms of officer behavior and a singular focus on targeted high-risk areas. The 
systems thinking concept will be applied to a recommended safety management system 
later in this thesis. 
I. SUMMARY 
This literature review was intended to represent a comprehensive examination of 
the issues surrounding law enforcement safety, identifying the current challenges and 
problems existing in the profession, and exploring the range and variety of safety 
programs existing in other high-risk organizations. Understanding why accidents happen 
and the role culture and leadership play in organizations with successful safety programs, 
were determined to be important in constructing recommendations for a safety 
management framework. Additionally, the identification of gaps in injury data collection 
and a systems thinking approach play a critical role in the ability to view safety 
comprehensively in organizations. Prior to exploring the law enforcement problem in 
                                                 
124Graham, Domestic Security 2015. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Marais, Dulac and Leveson, “Beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability Organizations.” 
127 Ibid. 
128 “Overview of Systems Thinking,” Thinking Page, accessed 10/25, 2015, http://www.thinking.net/
Systems_Thinking/OverviewSTarticle.pdf. 
 32 





III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The focus of this research centered on the study of safety programs and practices 
utilized in high-risk organizations, with the goal of developing the framework for a 
comprehensive law-enforcement safety management system. Programs, policies, and 
smart practices from private industry and other government organizations, to include the 
military and public safety, were evaluated for their effectiveness, comprehensive 
approach, and potential applicability to the law enforcement profession. Understanding 
that law enforcement organizations vary widely in size and resources, the focus was on 
developing a recommended framework that is flexible in design, and capable of applying 
validated safety management strategies to both small and large agencies. 
B. SELECTION 
Government and private industry host a variety of safety programs to address and 
regulate hazards and unsafe behaviors within organizations. Many of the programs 
evaluated incorporate a systems approach to safety, ensuring coordination among 
organizational entities and a focus on overall risk management. These safety management 
systems address both safety processes and the behaviors of employees.  
To recommend an effective safety management system for law enforcement, 
programs and systems in other high-risk professions were examined. Specific segments 
of private industry that operate in high-risk environments, such as the nuclear sector and 
chemical companies, rely on established safety protocols to reduce risk, prevent accidents 
and mitigate exposure to employees on a daily basis. 
Other government organizations, such as the military, operate in a comparable 
high-risk, dynamic, and rapidly evolving operational environment similar to that found in 
the law enforcement profession. Examining safety protocols in military operations and 
training may prove valuable in identifying effective practices that can be adopted by law 
enforcement to reduce risk. Special emphasis was placed on the review of realistic 
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scenario-based training, risk management practices in operations, and regulations and 
standards. 
The fire service also offered opportunities to examine best practices and effective 
safety protocols for working in high-risk operational and training environments. Fire 
department safety programs sparked particular interest for research due to their 
comprehensive and established safety programs, existing working relationship with law 
enforcement, and the continued development of safety as a specialized field within the 
fire profession. The fire service has a long-standing and formal safety officer program in 
place that incorporates dedicated resources to oversee the safety of its personnel and 
mitigate risk. As public safety partners, the value of sharing standardized safety practices 
on joint operations is critical, and expected under the Incident Command System (ICS). 
Examining the fire service’s approach to safety from an organizational perspective may 
lead to recommendations for effective practices in the law enforcement field. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF STUDY 
A significant gap identified for the study of safety programs in the law 
enforcement profession is the lack of accurate data on accidents and injuries. Although 
statistics exist for officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty, no accurate database 
captures the number of line of duty injuries or accidents, or provides a validated list of 
the most frequent types of injuries that occur. A model safety program can be developed 
only with a comprehensive understanding of the type and frequency of injuries and 
accidents sustained in the line of duty, but this information remains largely unavailable.  
Current law enforcement safety programs are often developed based on line-of-
duty death statistics, but these numbers are significantly smaller for statistical analysis in 
comparison to the number of accidents and injuries experienced in the profession. Until a 
national database is developed that captures accurate statistics on officer accidents and 
injuries, the true extent of the problem will remain unknown, and areas that demand focus 
will not be identified. In addition, there is a need for agencies to recognize specific injury 
and accident trends that may be unique to their organization or region.  
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The scope of this thesis is not to focus on a variety of singular and specific 
programs to address targeted risks, but rather on the development of a system or 
framework that would incorporate a comprehensive risk management approach to safety. 
As an example, response driving has been identified as a high-risk behavior that should 
be targeted in a model law enforcement safety program. This thesis, however, will not 
evaluate the effectiveness of individual response driving programs, but instead identify 
recommended system components that can be incorporated in a global program to 
address all such high-risk behaviors.  
D. DATA SOURCES 
Data and evidence for this thesis was obtained from secondary source material 
that exists in published statistics, case studies, internal reports and reviews, as well as 
academic journal articles on safety management systems and programs in both private 
and public organizations. This researcher also possesses significant experience in law 
enforcement, and in the application of safety programs within the profession, providing 
personal knowledge and insight into numerous issues raised throughout the research.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The analytical steps involved in building the framework for a law-enforcement 
safety management system will begin with establishing a clear description of the need for 
an increased focus on safety in the profession. Need will be demonstrated through 
available fatality, injury, and accident statistics, as well as examples provided from actual 
incidents where preventable accidents and injuries have occurred. 
The next step will involve a comprehensive literature review identifying the most 
common and frequent types of risk experienced by police officers, followed by a 
description and evaluation of various safety programs in the law enforcement profession 
today. Best practice research of safety programs in high-risk organizations in private 
industry, the fire service, and the military will then be conducted to determine effective 
practices and common components. Research into why accidents happen and how a 
systems approach can be applied to safety management will be also examined. An 
analysis will then be made of all programs studied; various models and smart practices 
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will be identified; and commonalties recognized will be noted that could be effectively 
applied to form a recommended safety management framework.  
F. OUTCOMES 
The intended outcome for this research is to recommend the framework for a 
model safety management system that will contribute to the goal of reducing injuries and 
fatalities in the law enforcement profession. Law enforcement agencies, regardless of 
size, should be able to adopt and apply this framework to their organization, using 
identified and recommended smart safety practices and common components that form 
the basis of an effective safety management system. The research will also attempt to 
demonstrate how this approach provides value over the current practice of law 
enforcement safety programs in use today that narrowly address areas of targeted risk and 
often operate in organizational silos.  
The following chapters of this thesis construct an argument for a systematic and 
comprehensive approach to law enforcement safety. Chapter IV identifies the current 
problem through an examination of the role of culture and leadership on safety, 
identification of the leading risks in law enforcement, current gaps in the profession 
regarding injury and accident data, and how performance metrics are used to measure 
safety in current programs. Chapter V explores possible solutions through an examination 
of current safety programs, practices, and models in law enforcement, the fire service, 
private industry and the military. An analysis of this research is conducted in Chapter VI 
and findings discussed, with numerous issues identified for further study and 
development. Recommendations toward developing a systems approach to law 
enforcement safety are offered in Chapter VII, to assist law enforcement agencies in 
applying a comprehensive framework to safety management and reducing line-of-duty 
accidents and injuries.  
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IV. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
A. SAFETY CULTURE 
Safety culture has long been recognized by research as having a significant impact 
on the safety performance of organizations. A culture of safety takes years to develop, but 
in time becomes deeply engrained in an organization, influencing and driving the 
employee’s daily attitudes, behaviors, and values. The literature contains many different 
definitions of safety culture, all with some common elements, however, United 
Kingdom’s Health and Safety Commission offers one of the most comprehensive, 
describing it as 
the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and 
patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to and the style and 
proficiency of an organization’s safety and health programs. Organizations 
with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications 
founded on mutual trust, shared perceptions of the importance of safety, 
and confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.129  
A less technical definition describes culture as 
the invisible force behind the tangibles and observables in any 
organization, a social energy that moves people to act. Culture is to an 
organization what personality is to the individual—a hidden, yet unifying 
theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilization.130 
The term “safety culture” was created after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 
1986, which was “caused by a breakdown in the plant’s attitude and approach toward 
operational safety.”131 The Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters led NASA to 
conduct extensive studies on the safety culture within its organization, concluding, 
“While training, awareness, and incentive programs can result in short-term changes, it is 
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the underlying culture that must be supportive for sustainable improvement on safety to 
occur.”132  
Instilling a positive safety culture requires a multifaceted approach. It includes the 
goal of “reducing accidents and injuries, ensuring that safety-related issues receive 
prompt attention, developing shared beliefs among members about risk and safety, and 
determining the style and efficiency of safety programs within organizations.”133 As 
quoted in Cooper’s article on Safety Management in the Emergency Response Services, 
Dilley and Kleiner contend that “creating a culture of safety means that employees are 
constantly aware of the hazards and risks within the workplace, including ones they 
create themselves.”134 
Organizations operating with a positive safety culture include a synthesis of 
recognized best practices in policy development and standard operating procedures, 
focusing on both people and processes, which comprise an effective framework for safety 
within the organization. M.S. Mannan, Ray A. Mentzer and Jiaqi Zhang developed a 
number of attributes for a comprehensive Best-in-Class safety culture after years of 
studying a wide range of different organizations with successful, effective programs.135 
Although not always discussed and listed collectively, these specific attributes have been 
identified throughout this research as common to effective safety programs across all 
organizations, and have direct application to the law enforcement profession. The Best-
in-Class safety attributes identified through the study are listed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Best-in-Class Safety Attributes 
 
Source: M. S. Mannan, Ray A. Mentzer and Jiaqi Zhang, “Framework for Creating a 
Best-in-Class Safety Culture,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 
(2013): 1424. 
1. Organizational Theory 
As quoted in an article by Kim Sloat, Edgar H. Schein describes the culture of an 
organization as existing on three levels: artifacts, values, and assumptions.136 Artifacts 
represent both things and written procedures, and in a safety culture are represented by 
signs, posters, personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as rules and regulations 
regarding safety protocols. Values represent the adopted safety values of the organization 
such as mission statements, goals, and principles; they “are the reasons given to explain 
the artifacts.”137 Assumptions represent the unconscious beliefs of an organization’s 
safety culture. These unconscious beliefs often become so ingrained by members of the 
group that they are not questioned. When these three levels are viewed collectively from 
Schein’s perspective, “the safety culture of an organization can be described as the shared 
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artifacts, values and assumptions that people hold in common.”138 Figure 3 illustrates 
Schein’s three-layer culture model. 
Figure 3.  Schein Culture Model 
 
Source: Emergent Solutions, “Organizational Culture and Change Management.” Last 
modified April 9, 2013. http://www.esodl.com/esodl/2013/04/organizational-culture-and-
change-management.html 
In both the police and firefighting professions, Schein’s model outlining three 
levels of organizational culture can be applied to explain behavior. The existing 
assumptions and beliefs held by officers and firefighters in the organization reinforce the 
cultural values that are adopted by the employees. This then leads to behaviors of 
unacceptable risk within the organizations, leading to an increase of accidents and 
injuries.139 Examples of cultural values common to both professions that lead to 
unacceptable risk include line-of-duty deaths that are automatically labeled as heroic, 
regardless of whether they are preventable; driving in a reckless manner that endangers 
the life of the first responder or the community in order to quickly arrive at the scene of 
an emergency; resistance to wearing seat belts due to the belief they will hinder the 
ability to quickly exit the vehicle to address a threat; desire to show “toughness” during 




scenario-based training exercises; and resistance to efforts of promote various health and 
safety initiatives.140 
Organizations operating with an effective culture of safety go far beyond simply 
complying with established safety practices, rules, and regulations. Organizations 
exhibiting a positive safety culture are also said to operate with an informed culture. As 
quoted in an article by Hirsch Ruchlin et al., James Reason states that an informed culture 
contains several different components, which he lists as reporting, just, flexible, and 
learning.141 These components, Reason argues, are “critical to the effectiveness of any 
safety management system.”142  
Reason describes a reporting culture as an organizational climate where 
employees are not only encouraged and expected to report accidents and near misses, but 
do so as a matter of practice.143 A just culture supports and may even reward the 
reporting of safety-related concerns, without the fear of unwarranted or excessive 
discipline. In law enforcement, a flexible culture proves even more important, allowing 
lower levels in the organizations, such as patrol officers, to exert individual control over 
emergency situations and resolve safety concerns, without first referring to upper levels 
of command: “Taking control of problems when they become immediately apparent, 
without waiting for direction from management, is a definitive sign of an organization 
with a strong safety culture.”144 Organizations with an informed culture also adopt 
continuous learning as a concept, to improve safety, operations, and efficiencies. 
Examples of continuous learning organizations in law enforcement are those that utilize 
near miss reporting, safety and incident debriefing sessions, and after-action reports to 
improve safety practices.145 
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Examining organizations in the context of Theory X and Theory Y can also assist 
in understanding organizational culture. Law enforcement agencies have traditionally 
operated as Theory X organizations, identified as having a culture of blaming individuals 
for management control failures, and making excessive use of discipline and 
regulations.146 Theory X organizations operate on the principle that employees are not 
self-motivated and need to be ordered to comply with regulations and policies. This 
premise has led to the creation of an abundance of general orders, standard operating 
procedures, and other regulations guiding the everyday tasks of police officers. 
Alternatively, Theory Y organizations operate on the premise that employees are 
self-motivated, want to influence decisions and be involved, and use their skills and 
abilities to serve their organization effectively.147 Achieving a positive safety culture 
involves gaining employee engagement at all levels, where safety behaviors are exhibited 
because they are valued, not because they are policy. Theory Y organizations are far 
more likely to be successful in developing positive cultural change within the ranks.148  
2. Role of Leadership 
Leadership plays a critical role in the development of a positive safety culture 
within organizations, and can negatively affect even the best safety management systems 
and programs in operation. Krause and Weekley state “a leader who is credible and who 
places a high value on safety not only personally pays more attention to safety 
improvement, but also influences others to do so.”149 According to Schein, leaders create 
culture by what they pay attention to, how they model behavior, and what they deal with, 
not by what they say.150 As quoted in Divergent Effects of Transformational and Passive 
Leadership on Employee Safety, David Hofmann and Frederick Morgeson found that 
“high-quality leader-member exchange contributed to improved safety communication 
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and safety commitment, which in turn contributed to reduced accidents and injuries.”151 
Literature strongly supports the premise that organizations experience better safety results 
when leaders actively promote and place a priority on safety in the workplace.  
The role of leadership in organizational safety involves “reducing exposure to risk 
and creating a favorable climate and culture for safety.”152 Leaders must not only set 
expectations for safety, but must role model the same behaviors to create buy-in from 
their employees. As Carrillo found, “employees have identified perceived lack of 
management commitment as one of the strongest barriers to support for organizational 
safety efforts.”153 Effective safety leadership involves not only managing safety 
objectives and policies, but also influencing culture to enhance an organization’s 
commitment to safety. To advance safety and prompt lasting cultural change, leaders 
must define and uphold safety as a core value of the organization, not simply a program. 
This can be accomplished by ensuring safety is a central element of all tasks, projects, 
plans and operations.154 
Patrick Hudson created a Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Management 
System Cultural Ladder, defining a “pathway from less to more advanced safety cultures 
within organizations.”155 This model, depicted in figure four, reflects the attitudes and 
values found in organizations at various levels of safety culture, and suggest that 
proactive leadership is critical to achieving a positive culture of safety. 
  
                                                 
151 Kelloway, Mullen and Francis, Divergent Effects of Transformational and Passive Leadership on 
Employee Safety, 76–86. 
152 Krause and Weekley, Safety Leadership, 34–40. 
153 Carrillo, Safety Leadership: Managing the Paradox, 31–34. 
154 David J. Sarkus, “Advancing the Servant-Leadership in Safety,” Professional Safety (1996): 27–
32. 
155 Patrick Hudson, “Implementing a Safety Culture in a Major Multi-National,” Safety Science 45 
(2007): 697–722. 
 44 
Figure 4.  HSE Management System Cultural Ladder 
 
Source: Patrick Hudson, “Implementing a Safety Culture in a Major Multi-National,” 
Safety Science 45 (2007): 704. 
Safety leadership must be modeled and reinforced at all levels of police 
organizations, both in upper management and at the first-line supervisor level. Unsafe 
behaviors often appear at the line level, where the need to reinforce safety becomes 
critical. If left unaddressed by first-line supervisors, these risky behaviors can negatively 
affect newer and more impressionable officers who learn to model these behaviors.156 
These behaviors then become a routine and accepted practice that contributes to a 
negative safety culture within the organization.  
This concern has been identified in law enforcement Field Training Instructor 
(FTI) programs, where irresponsible FTIs sometimes model and teach improper tactics 
and techniques that unnecessarily increase exposure to risk, such as not wearing seatbelts. 
Reinforcing these negative behaviors can lead to life-long habits that jeopardize both 
officer and community safety. Effective FTIs who contribute to positive safety cultures 
continually look for unsafe behaviors and promptly correct them, do not cut corners on 
safety tactics or techniques, and readily admit their own safety errors when making 
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mistakes.157 Ensuring proper safety leadership at all levels in the organization is critical 
to developing an effective safety culture. 
Research on the relationship between leadership style and safety results suggests 
that transformational leaders elicit better safety outcomes in organizations.158 
Transformational leaders are described by Krause and Weekley as having four 
dimensions challenging, engaging, inspiring and influencing.159 These directly translate 
to creating an effective safety culture by  
challenging employees to develop new ways of thinking and addressing 
safety-related problems; engaging employees by coaching, mentoring and 
providing feedback; inspiring commitment in employees by role modeling 
safe behaviors and communicating a vision for safety within the 
organization; and influencing all levels of the organization by building a 
sense of commitment towards a safe work environment and gaining 
respect and trust.160  
Leadership also plays a role in identifying hazards in the workplace. The 
challenge for leadership is to “establish an environment and a process where hazards and 
risks are identified and routinely examined to ensure the most effective and practical 
controls are in place.”161 Although elimination of hazards is preferred, it is not often 
possible in policing. As a result, instituting effective controls becomes critical to reducing 
risk and exposure to threats. Leaders exhibiting effective safety leadership understand 
this key function and ensure employees have proper safety equipment, practices, policies, 
and training in place to reduce accidents and injuries. Leadership must then conduct 
audits to ensure that employees are following proper protocols. 
In some organizations, especially in private corporations where profit depends on 
production, leaders have to carefully balance the polarity between safety and productivity 
or performance. Failure to manage this paradox properly can have a negative effect on 
workplace safety programs and lead employees to believe that leadership is more 
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committed to performance than to safety outcomes, leading to increased accidents and 
injuries.162 According to Carrillo, “leaders who are able to talk intelligently about the 
ethical issues that underlie polarities are better able to inspire and motivate employee 
commitment to safety.”163 This safety paradox is not limited to private industry, but also 
found in public safety agencies where limited resources, training mandates, and political 
and community priorities often drive decision-making and generate pressure to 
accomplish tasks. Understanding and discussing the polarity principle assists leaders with 
balancing situations involving safety in the workplace.  
How leaders handle accidents and injuries also plays a critical role in establishing 
an effective safety culture in organizations. Leaders must develop a culture of 
accountability, not blame, in addressing safety-related incidents.164 “Accountability is 
considered a best practice that is found in high-functioning organizations and differs from 
simply placing blame for mistakes.”165 Accountability entails not only addressing 
individual unsafe behaviors, but also addressing organizational issues through methodical 
incident investigations to determine if other issues may be contributing to accidents, in 
order to make improvements and reduce future risk.166 Leaders who focus on holding 
employees accountable as opposed to placing blame instill credibility and support for 
safety programs and practices. 
B. AREAS OF RISK TO LAW ENFORCEMENT SAFETY  
Several common areas of risk have been identified throughout literature as 
leading contributors to the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities occurring in the 
law enforcement profession. The Officer Safety and Wellness Group (OSW), formed by 
COPS and BJA to compile and share information that reduces risks, increases safety, and 
enhances wellness in the policing profession, listed four key themes for safety in a 2014 
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report: operational and emergency response, leadership and management, mental and 
physical health and wellness, and training.167  
Other contributing factors commonly discussed include a negative safety culture, 
driving and traffic related incidents, and stress and heart attacks. Although firearm 
incidents and encounters are also listed throughout current literature as a priority for 
safety, for the purpose of this research, the focus of inquiry was on those areas where 
agencies and officers have substantial control over safety-related outcomes and 
behaviors. 
1. Culture 
Culture remains a top priority due to its influence on and ability to impact all 
other efforts at safety within the profession. A negative safety climate can counteract the 
effectiveness of sound safety management programs in an organization. Organizations 
develop two ways of getting work done: official protocols and systems that guide 
behaviors and performance, and actual practices that become routine and institutionalized 
as a result of the culture within the organization. This culture becomes the accepted way 
to operate, often creating a divergence between management and those carrying out 
operational tasks.168 When organizational culture operates outside the guidance of safety 
programs and protocols, the risk of injuries and accidents increases. 
High-profile professional organizations within law enforcement and the fire 
service have identified culture as a critical area in need of attention. The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), 
Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS), National Law Enforcement Officer’s 
Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), National 
Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF), and the International Association of Fire Fighters 
(IAFF), have all published documents identifying culture as a contributing factor in line 
of duty injuries and fatalities, and supporting the need to conduct additional research into 
the issue.  
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Law enforcement has a strong sub-culture operating within the profession that 
leads to increased risk of injuries and fatalities. As described by Darrel Stephens and 
Leonard Matarese, “in policing, there is a tendency to accept injuries as part of the risk of 
the job and a reluctance to do the type of analysis required to learn from mistakes.”169 
Annual LEOKA data and interviews with peers and supervisors of officers accidently 
killed in the line-of-duty reveal the emergence of several common cultural characteristics 
that are attributed to LODDs, including an “It will never happen to me” mindset, and a 
feeling of invincibility regarding the possibility of on duty accidents.170 This attitude of 
invincibility often leads to a higher level of risk taking in both operations and in the 
training environment, where officers often feel the need to impress their peers.  
Additionally, high-risk behaviors that result in successful outcomes are often 
rewarded and publicized by law enforcement agencies, touting them as heroic. In 
addition, LODDs are almost always given heroic sendoffs, even if the fatality results 
from officer negligence or inappropriate behavior. These are examples of law 
enforcement cultural characteristics that may contribute to risk-taking behavior, where 
officers often put service and sacrifice above safety in pursuit of such recognition.171 
Law enforcement culture has also stigmatized the treatment of mental health 
problems within the profession. Support for the acknowledgement and treatment of 
emotional issues has been lacking or inconsistent at best, and officers often brand the 
need for such treatment as a sign of weakness. Officers also worry about the impact 
treatment will have on their permanent record, how they will be judged by their peers, 
and whether they will be labeled unfit for duty. Mandated policies for mental health 
referrals, education on the growing mental health issues in the profession, and the 
effective handling of mental health incidents by leadership can have a significant, 
positive impact on eliminating the stigma associated with seeking help. 
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Cultural issues affecting other public safety first responders were also examined 
to determine if similar trends existed, and what strategies were being implemented to 
address them. Research suggests that uniformed professions such as police, fire, and the 
military, have unique cultures and characteristics, such as a profound sense of duty and 
dedication that are uncommon to other professions, and a feeling of general isolation 
from other professions within society.172 As local first responders, firefighters work in 
similar high-risk and unpredictable environments, and face a multitude of safety-related 
challenges similar to those of police officers. As noted in the National Safety Culture 
Change Initiative Report, research shows that firefighters experience on average 90,000 
injuries per year and 100 line-of-duty deaths.173 Duty-related annual fatality statistics for 
law enforcement are somewhat similar to those in the fire service, but an accurate 
comparison of injury statistics cannot be made due to the absence of injury data available 
on police officers.  
To better address firefighter LODDs and injuries, FEMA recently published a 
report in April 2015, discussing the impact of organizational culture on firefighter safety. 
The National Safety Culture Change Initiative (NSCCI) project was a partnership of the 
U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) and the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) 
“aimed at identifying both positive and negative culture and climate found in the 
American fire and emergency services community.”174 The report identified and focused 
largely on the negative cultural aspects that have contributed unnecessarily to firefighter 
injuries and deaths, and recommended strategies to address behavioral changes to 
improve safety. 
Within the NSCCI report, many of the same concerns for firefighter safety and 
cultural issues were discovered as those affecting police officers. Numerous areas of 
safety were identified by the NSCCI report that shares commonalities with safety in the 
law enforcement profession. These are considered priorities for attention and include 
“situational awareness, individual responsibility, leadership, health and wellness, 
                                                 




training, vehicle operations, and seat belt usage.”175 The report also identified that 
behavioral issues were a contributor to both firefighter injuries and LODDs, and that 
“cultural change is needed to alter the perceptions of acceptable and unacceptable 
risks.”176 
Fire departments, like police departments, function as individual organizations 
within the framework of a larger organizational culture, with common themes and values 
present.177 In line with the police officer image, “the image of the firefighter was built 
around selfless heroism, ready to make the supreme sacrifice in order to saves lives and 
property.”178 Community expectations of “urgent and timely response to emergencies 
and disasters, with fully trained personnel,” further drive this expectation.179  
Research into the culture of firefighters through the NSCCI project has shown 
similar findings to those of the law enforcement profession. As quoted in the NSCCI 
report, Sue Lewis, a scholar studying gender and racial inequity issues in firefighter 
selection and training, has shown the culture of firefighting has demonstrated “disturbing 
and uniform characteristics that have been normalized under the guise of tradition.”180 
David Archer states that “cultural processes are introduced to firefighters when they go 
through their initial training.”181 These “traditions” and cultural attributes are believed to 
have a significant impact on decision-making. 
According to H. Cross, a subject matter expert who was a contributing author on 
the publication titled Understanding and Implementing the 16 Firefighter Life Safety 
Initiatives, “firefighter fatalities are closely linked to unsafe practices and a culture that is 
not fully committed to safety.”182 This point is reinforced by a study conducted between 
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1973 and 2007 that showed a “44 percent reduction in the number of civilian deaths 
related to fire, and a 40 percent reduction of fires overall.”183 During this same time 
period, however, “there was no reduction in the number of firefighters who died in the 
line of duty, suggesting that the root cause for many firefighter fatalities may be related to 
cultural attributes.”184  
2. Training 
Most training accidents share one common characteristic—they are 
preventable.185 Realistic scenario-based training has become a significant contributor to 
injuries and accidents in the law enforcement profession. Although training accidents 
involving firearms are more likely to lead to fatalities, the majority of serious training 
accidents in law enforcement occur in defensive tactics and physical control classes.186 
These accidents are attributed to numerous factors, including inadequate or nonexistent 
safety equipment, poor safety protocols, unclear objectives, and the lack of dedicated 
safety officers to oversee training exercises.187 
It is common knowledge that training accidents and injuries are frequent in the 
profession. Scenario-based training causes an increased risk for injury, and law 
enforcement agencies often do not apply the same risk assessment procedures and 
dedicated safety resources to the training environment that they do on operations, 
sometimes resulting in tragic outcomes. Agencies also struggle with determining what 
level of risk they are willing to accept in the training environment, an issue that is deeply 
affected by culture. An approach that prohibits scenario-based training will avoid 
increased liability and enhanced risk to its personnel, but will not properly prepare its 
officers for the realistic threats they will face on the street, as well as the quick decisions 
they will be forced to make. This approach can have a negative impact on both officer 
and community safety.  
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Although a zero-tolerance policy for fatalities in training is necessary, applying 
that same policy to injuries is not reasonable given the need to provide officers with 
realistic scenarios that best prepare them to respond effectively to physical encounters 
and other high-risk challenges. Finding a balance between providing realistic training 
programs and safety, and determining what level of risk is acceptable, continues to be a 
difficult challenge for law enforcement agencies nationwide. 
Kat Kelly describes numerous causative factors attributed to accidents in the law 
enforcement training environment: technological advancements, administrative barriers, 
training plan deviations, and inexperienced trainers.188 The advancement of technology 
has allowed law enforcement to enhance scenario-based training, which exposes officers 
to controlled danger or elevated risk in order to better prepare them for real events. Areas 
where scenario-based training is commonly conducted in law enforcement include 
firearms-related training, force-on-force training, active-shooter training, defensive 
tactics, and response or pursuit driving. The closer that training scenarios approach 
reality, the more dangerous the training is to the participants. Although computer 
simulation equipment has enabled certain professions to enhance training and decision 
making in a safe environment, such as the aviation industry, the equipment is costly and 
often impractical in today’s public safety budgets. Additionally, many tasks require 
hands-on, interactive training with other participants to develop specific skills.  
Administrative barriers can create even greater challenges to conducting needed 
training for law enforcement agencies. Economic downfalls have created significant cuts 
in police department budgets, and training is often the first area to be impacted. Budget 
cuts often result in less training equipment, a reduction in training staff, less time to 
conduct training, and less money for developing certified and professional instructors.189 
Additionally, agency leaders often do not understand or support enhanced or progressive 
training scenarios, failing to see the need for proactive preparation, and overreact to 
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injuries that do occur by canceling training sessions instead of investigating the cause of 
the accident and applying corrections to the training environment.190 
Deviations to training lesson plans and safety protocols have also been cited as 
contributors to training accidents. Deviations include inserting unplanned injects into 
scenarios, as well as allowing scenarios to continue past programmed “stop points,” 
where role player reactions cannot be predicted or controlled.191 Impromptu training by 
well-intended and motivated officers in the field can also result in tragic consequences, as 
these incidents often occur outside controlled training environments and without proper 
planning and safety protocols in place. 
A more critical factor contributing to accidents in the law enforcement training 
environment is the lack of professionally trained and experienced instructors. 
Understanding how to safely control and run scenario-based training exercises takes 
specific expertise, experience, and resources. Well-intended trainers often lack the 
knowledge to set appropriate goals and objectives, and can inadvertently create 
inappropriate responses during simulations. Additionally, inexperienced training 
instructors often fail to incorporate dedicated safety officer resources to the training 
environment. Lack of adequate resources needed to effectively run an active or 
complicated scenario also leads instructors to double assignments, resulting in lack of 
oversight and critical gaps in safety. 
3. Driving and Traffic-Related Incidents 
Vehicle and traffic-related accidents make up approximately half of all line-of-
duty deaths annually, with thousands more injured while behind the wheel or in traffic-
related accidents.192 Officer deaths from motor vehicle accidents increased between 1980 
and 2008, while deaths for other reasons in this same time period declined.193 According 
to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), “from 1982–2008, a 
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total of 823 law enforcement officers were killed in driving accidents involving both 
vehicles and motorcycles.”194 In contrast to private automobile insurance company data 
that shows “males under the age of 25 are more likely to be involved in a vehicle 
accident,” data in law enforcement shows that “officers in their mid-30s with 
approximately 10 years of experience face a greater risk of dying in a duty-related vehicle 
accident.”195  
Speed has been identified as “one of the primary factors in police vehicle crashes, 
and half of all fatal crashes are single vehicle accidents.”196 Evidence suggests that the 
greatest improvement in vehicle safety within the law enforcement profession could be 
achieved simply by officers increasing their use of seat belts.197 Additionally, “nearly 
half of officers killed in traffic accidents over the past three decades were not wearing 
their seatbelts.”198 Although officers understand the importance of wearing seat belts, 
many feel that the “use of a seatbelt in certain situations actually increases their risk due 
to the extra time it takes to exit their patrol vehicle and draw a weapon” when a threat is 
present.199  
This problem is not isolated to the policing profession, as “more than three-
quarters of firefighters killed in line-of-duty vehicle accidents in the last 30 years were 
not wearing seat belts.”200 Additional contributors to injuries and fatalities include 
aggressive driving behaviors outside of legal limits to arrive quickly at calls, failure to 
use both lights and sirens during response driving, and a feeling of invincibility by 
officers.201 
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The operation of police vehicles, especially in response and pursuit driving 
situations, has generated significant discussion and concern, due to the unintended 
consequences of property damage, injuries, and fatalities to both officers and citizens, 
resulting in more restrictive policies.202 Pursuit or response driving requires a set of 
physical skills that must be maintained through regular training. Officers are trained in 
vehicle operations in the academy, but unlike firearms skills that require annual training 
and certification, officers are often not required to attend regular in-service programs to 
maintain vehicle skills.  
The number of officers killed in vehicle accidents while traveling to assist in 
pursuits has been steadily increasing for several decades.203 Concerns have been raised 
that the presence of tire deflation devices in patrol cars may be resulting in secondary 
officers driving at unsafe speeds in order to deploy the devices ahead of the pursuit.204 
The safety risk to officers deploying tire deflation devices is significant, as fleeing 
suspects often leave the roadway in an attempt to go around devices or parked vehicles. 
Officers have also been struck by passing motorists not involved in the pursuit while 
deploying or retrieving the devices. As the number and variety of tire deflation devices 
have increased, so have the number of officers killed attempting to deploy those 
devices.205 
The value of community and officer safety over immediate suspect apprehension 
in pursuit and response driving has taken priority due to civil liability and negligence 
lawsuits initiated against jurisdictions. Safety-minded agencies are changing procedures 
to limit when pursuits may be initiated and how they are conducted, mandating regular 
vehicle operations training, and exploring alternative, safe methods to slowing pursued 
vehicles. Research and experimentation into electronic kill switch technology that can 
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remotely turn off the ignition of fleeing suspect vehicles offers future promise for safe 
alternatives in ending police pursuits. 
Police vehicle operation is also complicated by the complexity of today’s modern 
police vehicle, which houses computers, radios, cameras, telephone, and other 
technological advances that officers must manage while in motion. The effects of multi-
tasking while driving and managing various information systems is not yet known, but 
research is currently being conducted by various organizations to better understand this 
relationship and the circumstances officers become involved in prior to vehicle accidents.  
In addition to driving incidents, officers are killed and injured each year in 
pedestrian-related accidents. Although there is no national report of officers struck by a 
vehicle, an 11-year study on occupational mortality in law enforcement from 1992 to 
2002 found that out of the 815 transportation-related officer fatalities recorded, over 20 
percent died outside of their vehicle while conducting duties on foot.206 Common 
incidents include officers being struck while directing traffic, investigating accidents, 
setting up cones, or conducting traffic stops.  
Practices and policies have been implemented in some agencies to reduce the risk 
of being struck, to include approaching occupants on the passenger side of vehicles 
during traffic stops, wearing high visibility reflective vests while on foot conducting 
accident investigations, and implementation of incident command protocols during major 
highway incidents to reduce the opportunity for compounding accidents and incidents. In 
2001, recommendations for prevention of pedestrian-related injuries and fatalities while 
working along roadways were developed by NIOSH specifically for firefighters, which 
included the use of reflective clothing and vests and training on safe procedures near 
moving traffic.207 The application of these recommendations to law enforcement appears 
practical, but studies do not exist to determine whether they have been implemented.208 
                                                 




4. Fatigue, Shift Work, and Complacency 
Sleep deprivation in the law enforcement profession continues to be a major 
concern. Beth Pearsall states in an article for the National Institute of Justice that “sleep 
disorders are twice as prevalent among law enforcement officers compared to the general 
public, and they remain largely undiagnosed and untreated in the profession.”209 It is well 
documented in research that accident rates increase, and alertness and sound decision-
making decreases, when fatigue sets in. Dr. Bryan Vila, a leading sleep research expert 
on the effects of officer fatigue, states: 
Sleep deprivation contributes to an officer’s irritability with the public and 
inability to maintain calm in situations due to diminishing attentiveness; it 
also impairs physical and cognitive abilities. Sleep deprivation sets up a 
vicious cycle: fatigue decreases your ability to deal with stress and stress 
decreases your ability to deal with fatigue.210 
Although the U.S. federal government has developed regulations to control the 
work hours of certain occupational groups in the transportation industry and other high-
risk occupations due to the impact of fatigue on job performance and public safety, 
nothing has been mandated for law enforcement.211 
Research is rich on the negative effects of shift work on police officers, citing 
increased stress, chronic fatigue, inability to concentrate, gastrointestinal problems, 
weight gain, and decreased morale. Police officers typically work long shifts that become 
extended due to personnel shortages, operational necessity, or emergency situations. 
Various shift configurations have also been shown to create greater fatigue in police 
officers, to include long shifts, shifts that are chosen by the employer and not the officer, 
and continuous night shifts.212 As quoted in Claire Mayhew’s article “Occupational 
Health and Safety Risks Faced by Police Officers,” M. Patterson states that “night work 
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involves a disruption to the normal body circadian rhythm and results in decreased 
capabilities.”213 This, in turn, can have a devastating impact on an officer’s ability to 
perform complicated tasks, maintain alertness and situational awareness, and conduct 
sound decision-making, compromising officer and community safety.  
The length of work shifts has also contributed to fatigue and health problems 
among police officers. Most police departments have moved away from traditional eight-
hour work shifts to a compressed schedule in which officers work 10- or 12-hour 
shifts.214 This allows officers more days off each week but requires longer shifts each 
day worked, which can have a negative impact on fatigue and alertness. As quoted in 
Pearsall’s article “Sleep Disorders, Work Shifts and Wellness in Officers,” a study by 
Karen Amendola at the Police Foundation found that 10-hour shifts provided officers 
with numerous benefits over the traditional 8-hour work shift, including more sleep due 
to additional days off and a higher quality of life at work.215 Other studies have been 
conducted on the benefits of various shift lengths, but most have failed to produce 
conclusive results.  
To compound the fatigue problem, officers also often work secondary overtime 
assignments on days off to enhance their financial situation, which limits scheduled rest 
periods. Officers often lack the discipline to voluntarily reduce overtime hours, and may 
even become financially dependent on the overtime pay. Adding to the problem of 
insufficient rest periods is the scheduling of mandated court appearances on days off by 
some agencies, so as not to interfere with operational work shifts. Additional court dates 
may also result from more complex criminal cases requiring additional court appearances 
or from continuances requested by defendants. Agency policies are needed to set 
reasonable restrictions on overtime hours, when court is scheduled, and hours worked 
each day to minimize fatigue and stress.  
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Officers who have been on the job for extended periods of time often become 
comfortable and complacent in carrying out their day-to-day tasks. Police complacency 
can be defined as “the non-recognition of danger and a false sense of contentment.”216 
When officers go long periods of time without a safety-related incident or near-miss 
experience, they develop an attitude that nothing will happen, continuing their pattern of 
inappropriate behavior. As a result, officers who become complacent are more inclined to 
take short cuts, ignoring established safety protocols and practices. Complacency also 
leads to the loss of situational awareness, where officers fail to see or anticipate problems 
before they arise. This creates problems where officers are caught by surprise and have to 
react instantly without mental or physical preparation, compromising their ability to 
safely resolve an incident. 
5. Physical and Emotional Health and Wellness 
It is well documented that policing is a profession that experiences a high-level of 
job-related stress. Research confirms that “police officers have an elevated risk for 
adverse mental and physical health problems in comparison to the general population.”217 
Excessive weight, poor nutrition, stress, and depression can lead to increased injuries, 
heart attacks, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and suicide. Studies also indicate that 
cardiovascular disease is higher in police officers than in almost all other occupations, 
and depression rates nearly twice as high as the general population.218 
Maintaining both the physical and psychological health of officers should be an 
agency priority. Keeping officers physically and emotionally fit is not only important for 
community engagement and safety, it has proven to be “cost-effective in its ability to 
prevent illness and fatalities, resulting in fewer sick days, disabilities, and injuries—
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thereby reducing health care costs for jurisdictions.”219 As Feidler notes, “the cost of a 
single, on-duty heart attack has been calculated by various law enforcement agencies to 
be in the $400,000 to $750,000 range.”220 
Suicide among active and retired police officers has become a growing concern in 
the profession. Factors contributing to the number of suicides include the high stress from 
the job and long working hours, exposure to traumatic events, depression, lack of support 
systems at home and within the department, and alcohol abuse.221 The National 
Occupational Mortality Surveillance conducted a national study that found the rate of 
police officers dying from suicide is 2.4 times higher than those from homicides.222 
While studies vary considerably on this subject, statistics show that “the suicide rate for 
police officers remains 17/100,000, compared to the general population’s rate of 
11/100,000.”223  
Variances for officer suicide rates are attributed to how fatalities are 
recorded. The Census of Fatal Occupational Injures (CFOI) is “the most 
comprehensive and timely source of workplace fatalities in the U.S. and is 
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).”224 The CFOI “generally 
only includes suicides that occur at the work site.”225 Data demonstrates, 
however, that only 10 percent of law enforcement suicides occur in the actual 
workplace, and thus does not represent a complete picture of suicide rates among 
active and retired officers.226 
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Police officers are also at high risk for PTSD, which can be triggered by exposure 
to extreme stress or traumatic events such as crime scenes, significant tragedies, near-
miss fatal incidents, or police shootings. The symptoms often associated with PTSD 
overlap with other anxiety-related disorders, and can lead to an improper diagnosis, 
especially if officers do not discuss traumatic events that they may have experienced. 
These symptoms may include nightmares, panic attacks, distressing and reoccurring 
images from a traumatic event, avoidance of all reminders of that event, and irritability. 
Acute stress from PTSD requires medical and psychiatric assessments, followed by 
prescribed therapy treatment.227 
Although society has become more accepting of mental health problems in recent 
years, seeking mental health care for issues associated with PTSD or other psychological 
problems still carries a significant stigma in the law enforcement profession. Fear of 
being stigmatized as mentally ill is a significant barrier to officers seeking help. Police 
officers fear this label will impede their career, resulting in fewer opportunities for 
promotion or a determination they are unfit for duty. Officers also fear that seeking 
mental health treatment would be perceived as a weakness, create distance between 
themselves and their peers, and ultimately lead to a lack of trust that would compromise 
safety. 
Police agencies implementing formal psychological programs that involve support 
and treatment for PTSD-related issues will be better prepared to recognize and treat these 
troubled behaviors. Leaders who put mechanisms in place to intervene and provide 
support and resources to officers who exhibit signs of PTSD also establish a positive 
culture for others in the agency to seek help when needed. 
C. DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Understanding where to direct safety prevention and mitigation efforts cannot be 
effectively realized without first determining benchmarks for data and performance 
outcomes. Two problems currently exist in the law enforcement profession regarding this 
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issue: the lack of accurate and detailed injury and accident data, and the lack of 
performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of safety programs currently in place.  
1. Injury, Accident, and Fatality Data  
A significant gap exists in the collection of law enforcement line-of-duty injury 
data. Data collection in the area of health and safety is focused primarily on line-of-duty 
fatalities and assaults on police officers. The FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted (LEOKA) program, prepared by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting System, is 
considered the most comprehensive source available. This statistical analysis, however, 
focuses solely on officers feloniously or accidently killed, and officers assaulted, 
providing limited insight on the types of risk that officers face.228 Although LEOKA 
reports provide significant information concerning the details surrounding each fatality, 
little information is available for accidental deaths.229  
The NLEOMF’s database of officer fatalities, broken down by primary reason, is 
the only other source of accurate data on LODDs. It is also “the only source that reports 
line-of-duty illness fatalities for law enforcement personnel.”230  
A report by the IACP on Reducing Officer Injuries provided a more detailed and 
complete injury picture in eighteen law enforcement agencies selected for the yearlong 
study. The results indicated that the majority of the injuries documented in the study were 
those that would not be captured by current collection mechanisms such as LEOKA or 
the Uniform Crime Report data.231 The study demonstrates the scope of the problem and 
reinforces the critical need to develop better injury reporting databases across the 
profession.  
In sharp contrast to the limited injury and fatality databases for law enforcement, 
the fire service utilizes numerous data sources from professional organizations to track 
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firefighter line-of-duty injuries and fatalities, providing a much more detailed and useful 
picture of the type, extent, and cause of injuries in the profession. The International 
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Death and Injury Survey is an annual report that 
collects information on “line-of-duty deaths and injuries, incidence and type of infectious 
disease exposure, and occupational injury and illness retirements.”232  
The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) produces an annual report 
“estimating the number of firefighter injuries based on a survey of city and county fire 
departments.”233 Injury data in this report is “broken down by type of duty and nature of 
injury.”234 A separate annual report on firefighter fatalities is also produced by the 
NFPA, which breaks down LODDs by “nature of injury, cause of injury, type of duty, 
and other factors.”235 The United States Fire Administration (USFA) captures firefighter 
LODDs in a separate annual report, breaking down each incident in detail, and providing 
“narrative information describing the circumstances of every fatality.”236 
The National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), maintained by the USFA, 
is an “incident-based database that contains information on firefighter causalities, as well 
as detailed information on firefighter injuries.”237 The database relies on voluntary 
reporting but contains information on fire incidents in 44 states.238 The NFIRS is a 
“sortable database, allowing records to be searched to study specific combinations and 
relationships between the nature and circumstances of injures.”239  
Lastly, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
produces firefighter fatality investigative reports as part of the Fatality Assessment and 
Control Evaluation (FACE) Program.240 These reports, which investigate a particular 
                                                 










subgroup of fatalities, are considered highly useful to identify technology-based solutions 
in the use of personal protective equipment that could lead to reductions in the number of 
injuries and fatalities.241 
In order to understand the extent and type of risk confronting the law enforcement 
profession, the number and type of injuries must be documented and analyzed. 
Understanding both injuries and fatalities, whether due to accident or intentional act, will 
provide the overview necessary to gain a thorough understanding of risk and allow 
agencies to prioritize policies and programs to address them. Without an understanding of 
the extent and nature of officer injuries, safety efforts will continue to be misdirected, 
leaving gaps in programs and prevention, and the true economic and operational impact 
to agencies will not be realized. This issue was important enough to be highlighted in the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, which cited the need for a “repository 
on data of law enforcement injuries, deaths, and near misses.”242 
The collection of data on officer injuries is important for several reasons. First, 
injuries present a significant cost to agencies due to the overtime required to staff vacant 
positions, increased insurance premiums, and workers’ compensation claims. Second, to 
effectively develop policies, programs and training to minimize risk and reduce injuries, 
it is critical to have a complete picture of injuries within the profession. The ability to 
obtain comprehensive data on injuries and fatalities would also provide opportunities to 
medical providers and other professionals to analyze incidents and accidents to improve 
training, tactics, equipment and medical care that may prevent injuries and save lives.243 
Lastly, because accurate data on police officer injuries and accidents is not known, the 
true impact on agencies cannot be determined. 
Strong barriers to injury and accident data collection exist in law enforcement, 
and arise from the failure and willingness of many agencies to share information due to 
fear of legal or professional reprisal and embarrassment. There is significant concern 
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among law enforcement leadership regarding how mistakes or failures will be 
communicated and shared publicly, and the impact of potential retribution.244 These fears 
are enhanced due to the media’s focus on highlighting problems and assigning blame. As 
Kenneth Husted and Snejina Michailova observed, “individuals do not freely and openly 
share knowledge about the mistakes they have made.”245  
In examining why law enforcement organizations do not learn from past failures, 
Philippe Baumard and William Starbuck explained that leaders often do not take 
responsibility for failures due to concerns regarding retribution, and reports that are 
produced may omit pertinent information to shield individuals from potential negative 
impact. There is often a fear that leaders might blame those who are involved in failed 
response operations and react to these failures by punishing them.246 These fears and 
perceptions permeate the public safety culture and interfere with accurate and effective 
reporting processes. The absence of this data and lessons learned result in the repetition 
of similar accidents, injuries, and fatalities across the profession.  
The medical field has attempted to overcome this obstacle through the 
establishment of a peer review process to “review and monitor the performance of 
physicians to ensure high quality care to patients.”247 The President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing cited the value of this process and the Healthcare Quality and 
Improvement Act of 1986 to the medical field, and called for a similar process to be 
implemented for the law enforcement profession.  
The professional peer review system is a practice that began centuries ago, but has 
more recently evolved into a formal process that provides a professional peer review 
management system to openly discuss accidents, mistakes, and near misses without fear 
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of reprisal or legal repercussions.248 The Healthcare Quality and Improvement Act of 
1986 was established by Congress to encourage good faith peer review. The primary 
function of the legislation was to “provide the hospital, the peer review board and the 
accusing physician immunity from a libel suit brought by the accused physician.”249 
Critics of the peer review process, however, argue that granting doctors with the 
ability to police members of their own profession may not be in the best interest of the 
public.250 The high profile attention on today’s police departments regarding policies and 
practices, accusations of bias and discrimination, and heightened concerns over a lack of 
transparency and fairness in the investigation of police-related shootings make the 
adoption of a similar professional peer review process unlikely for the law enforcement 
profession. The implementation of such a process in today’s climate would likely be 
interrupted as an additional attempt by the law enforcement profession to isolate and 
police themselves, and avoid liability, issues that have been at the forefront of police-
community tensions across the nation over the past 18 months. 
The purpose of requiring data collection and performance measurement is to 
assess the changes of safety within an agency after the implementation of programs 
aimed at reducing injuries and fatalities. Of the safety programs that exist in law 
enforcement, few have been successful in showing the effectiveness of these programs in 
reducing injuries or fatalities, as most programs implemented were established without 
performance metrics in mind.  
Data on police officer injuries and fatalities is available to most law enforcement 
agencies through their risk management division or workers’ compensation claims office. 
These offices can provide an analysis of injuries and claims in relationship to programs 
implemented, to assist in determining if specific safety objectives were achieved. The 
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accuracy of this data, however, is dependent on the honest reporting of injuries and 
accidents within each agency.  
Injury data is often inaccurate due to the desire of many officers to hide injuries 
and avoid being temporarily removed from regular assignments and placed in 
administrative roles. Reassignment, even for short periods of time, can negatively impact 
officers financially, who often collect shift differential or work overtime assignments to 
supplement their base income. Although limited in scope and detail, internal agency 
reporting authorities serve as an available resource for many agencies seeking to assess 
safety and more effectively direct resources toward prevention and mitigation. 
2. Measuring Performance  
To measure the effectiveness of safety programs within law enforcement, it is 
important to develop benchmarks and performance objectives that measure results. 
Poorly developed objectives that provide no method to assess improvement or 
effectiveness can lead to programs being discontinued or unfunded. Additionally, without 
an effective evaluation in place, the focus of resources toward safety-related initiatives 
might be misdirected, failing to identify and address critical priorities.  
A recently published report by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
(COPS) noted that the majority of law enforcement health, safety, and wellness programs 
in existence “have not been scientifically evaluated, the majority relying on research 
designs that make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about program effects.”251 As 
such, it is difficult to know if safety and wellness programs initiated are effective, and if 
so, to what extent.252 Although the COPS document highlights four law enforcement 
agencies for their model programs in officer safety, health or wellness, it points out the 
lack of empirical data to support whether such programs can be proven as effective, 
supporting the need for evaluation and metrics to be built into program design.253 
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In addition to determining its effectiveness in preventing injuries and fatalities, an 
evaluation of safety programs should include an analysis of the economic costs and 
benefits to the organization. This is often difficult to measure, as safety programs can be 
costly and resource intensive, and the economic impact not realized until a long-term 
analysis can be undertaken. The financial impact of officers suffering injuries in the line 
of duty, however, extends far beyond the actual injury and can increase organizational 
costs for worker compensation, increased insurance premiums, medical care, staffing 
shortages and hiring of new employees, training, and OSHA fines.254 Workplace injuries 
can also lead to other significant health concerns such as depression and absenteeism, 
which impact organizational productivity and safety.  
The law enforcement profession is not alone in its inability to measure the cost of 
safety effectively. Even in private industry, the economic impact and costs of safety 
intervention programs are rarely captured and reported.255 Private industry often attempts 
to measure safety program effectiveness by determining the return on investment (ROI), 
although workplace safety initiatives cannot be measured in law enforcement 
organizations by this traditional for-profit business model.256  
To properly assess organizational safety performance and programs in private 
industry and to set future goals, senior management gains access to information through 
both leading and lagging metrics. Lagging indicators are reactive and include injury and 
fatality reports, incident investigative reports, and near-miss reports that “assess the 
effectiveness of personal safety practices, and identify the tangible consequences of past 
safety performance.”257 Essentially, lagging indicators examine events that have already 
happened.  
Alternatively, the study of leading indicators provides a proactive analysis of 
safety practices that are meant to identify problems before accidents or incidents happen. 
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Examples of leading indicators are safety audit results, inspection reports, and risk 
assessments. Leading indicators are considered far more effective in predicting the 
smaller events that precede major accidents providing opportunities for intervention and 
prevention.258 Graham discusses a similar process of assessing organizational 
performance through the actuarial component of risk management, which studies the 
past, and the probabilistic component, which involves a proactive effort to identify 
problems and implement preventative measures before accidents occur.259  
A program developed by the Yolo County Sheriff’s Office in California provides 
an example of a successful effort to measure the outcome of a specific safety program, 
with the objective to improve traffic safety and reduce high-speed accidents in their 
agency. The process began with an evaluation of existing data that showed “there had 
been 616 instances of deputies exceeding 90 mph in the most recent 12-month period.”260 
Additional findings indicated that on average, over the past 10 years, 1.5 deputies had 
been injured per year, resulting in financial costs to the agency of more than $1 million in 
claims, damages, and legal fees.261  
To address the issue of excessive speed, Yolo County put a speed-monitoring 
program in place aimed at reducing the driving speed of its deputies. In addition to 
training, the department mandated that deputies voice their justification for exceeding 90 
MPH into the in-car mobile camera. These incidents were then reviewed each month by 
first line supervisors to address any concerns or violations of policy.262 As a result of the 
program, unjustified speed activations “were reduced by 91 percent in the first year, and 
94 percent in the second year, compared to pre-training activation levels.”263 Additional 
results demonstrated a significant reduction in vehicle accidents over a two-year time 
period, and zero on-duty, at-fault accidents by department personnel since the program 
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began.264 This not only increased the safety of officers behind the wheel, but also 
significantly decreased civil and criminal liability and the costs associated with officer 
injuries and repairing vehicle equipment. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the areas of risk in law enforcement for which both officers 
and agencies have significant control over through proper safety management. Although 
other threats and risks, such as attacks and ambushes, exist within the profession, the vast 
number of injuries and accidents occurring in law enforcement agencies are controllable 
and can be mitigated, if not prevented. 
The critical role of culture and leadership in the ability of an organization to 
achieve a positive safety culture was clearly demonstrated. The specific cultural 
challenges unique to law enforcement were identified, with similar comparisons to our 
public safety counterparts in the fire service. Understanding and recognizing these 
challenges is the first step toward developing strategies for change.  
Lastly, significant gaps were identified in the collection of injury and accident 
data throughout the profession. Also noted was the lack of performance metrics in place 
to address the existing safety-related programs currently in existence. Without such data, 
programs aimed at prevention and mitigation will likely lose support or exist without a 
comprehensive understanding of the program’s impact. 
In the next chapter, solutions for better managing safety in law enforcement will 
be explored through the examination of existing programs and initiatives in the 
profession, as well as safety programs found in other high-risk organizations. 
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V. SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS 
A. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
A safety management system (SMS) can be described as “a systematic framework 
where policy, objectives, strategy, organization, planning, resourcing, risk assessment, 
implementation, monitoring and measuring performance, and auditing can be tackled 
coherently.”265 As quoted in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
K.T. Ming defines a safety management system (SMS) as the “policies, objectives, 
organization, management controls and resources that are in place to manage safety, 
health and environment in all parts of the organization.”266 B. Kandola adds that a safety 
management system “must enable the assessment of risks to be carried out and as a result 
devise and implement adequate risk reduction measures and provide appropriate feedback 
mechanisms for further improvement.”267 
The application of systems thinking to safety management models is critical to 
ensure the coordination of efforts across the entire organization. Without developing a 
systematic approach to manage all aspects of safety, programs, and initiatives created 
often lack the proper risk analysis, performance measures, feedback, and coordination to 
address the gaps and problems the programs are targeting. Graham strongly supports the 
development of risk management systems to address areas of safety and liability 
throughout law enforcement agencies. A systems approach to safety allows organizations 
to recognize, prioritize, and address issues of importance, and eliminate the number of 
gaps between various entities within agencies. 
A primary purpose of safety management systems is to prevent the erosion of 
safety practices, and recognize near-miss incidents at an early stage to prevent accidents 
and injuries from occurring. While research identified no single model across industries, 
those that do exist contain common components or organizational functions that comprise 
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recognized, effective safety management systems. Safety programs make up the core of 
any safety management system, with their primary purpose to reduce exposure to a 
variety of hazards in the workplace.  
In order to evaluate current law enforcement safety programs against safety 
management approaches in other high-risk organizations, research was conducted into the 
safety programs and practices utilized in the law enforcement profession. Safety 
management practices in the fire service, military, and private sector were then examined 
for best practices that could be effectively applied to a law-enforcement safety 
management model. 
1. Law Enforcement Programs 
Although no comprehensive safety model or safety management system was 
located in the law enforcement profession, this research located numerous projects, 
programs and initiatives that demonstrate a dedicated effort at improving safety in 
targeted risk areas. These programs have value in the development and adoption of a 
comprehensive law-enforcement safety model, providing building blocks for safety 
management programs within the larger framework of a comprehensive safety 
management system. 
a. Project Destination Zero 
The National Law Enforcement Officer’s Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) has 
recently undertaken a nationwide study of law enforcement safety programs through a 
grant awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance entitled Destination Zero. The 
program “recognizes officer safety and officer wellness programs that proactively engage 
employees in initiatives that increase overall officer wellness and/or reduce line-of-duty 
injuries or deaths.”268 This project began in December of 2014 and identified 97 
departmental programs, professional resources, and third-party initiatives related to 
improving safety in the workplace.269 The project solicited submissions regarding 
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department safety programs through NLEOMF website submissions, Destination Zero 
advertisements, various professional publications, Internet research, and word of mouth.  
Safety programs were identified in three key areas: general officer safety (21 
submissions), traffic officer safety (24 submissions), and wellness (52 submissions).270 
Submissions were evaluated to determine the most comprehensive and strategically 
implemented program. Programs selected for consideration were then evaluated based on 
innovation, implementation, participation rate, history of the program, and success.271  
Throughout the project, challenges existed regarding the collection of information 
about the various programs. In many cases, programs were submitted online, and 
NLEOMF staff experienced difficulties in getting agencies to follow-up and provide a 
more detailed brief of their programs.272  
While reinforcing the growing number of health and safety-related programs in 
law enforcement, the study revealed few programs that took a comprehensive approach to 
safety across agencies. The focus for most agency programs centered around one of the 
targeted risk areas of officer health and wellness, such as fitness or response driving, 
leaving gaps and little oversight over other areas of concern. 
One program identified by the Destination Zero study as comprehensive in nature, 
is the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (Florida) Safety, Fitness and Wellbeing Program. 
This program can be considered comprehensive only in the risk area it was designed to 
target, as it does not address safety in other critical high-risk areas across the agency. 
What the program does provide are creative programs aimed at increasing the physical 
and emotional health of department members through education and participation in 
nutrition, physical fitness, stress reduction, and financial health classes.273 The Orange 
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County Sheriff’s Office has proven to be progressive in dedicating a permanent wellness 
coordinator to oversee their “Fit Deputy” Wellness Program.274  
The Fairfax County Police Department’s (VA) Safety Officer Program, formally 
established in 2008 with the appointment of a full-time safety officer position, is one of 
the more comprehensive police safety programs located during this research that supports 
a holistic approach to safety across the organization. It not only works to identify current 
and future hazards that officers may face in various areas throughout the department, it 
also utilizes dedicated safety officer resources to oversee and coordinate safety-related 
issues across the entire agency, including the deployment of safety officers to scenario-
based training exercises, high-risk operations, medical monitoring during PPE 
deployment, and training on the safe towing of vehicles.275  
As in the fire service’s Safety Officer Program, Fairfax County was the only 
agency found utilizing Incident Safety Officers (ISO), as designated under the Incident 
Command System (ICS), during response to high-risk operations. In this capacity, safety 
officers are assigned to work closely with incident commanders on operational incidents 
to conduct site assessments and identify any potential hazards, making recommendations 
as needed.276  
The Fairfax safety officer program, which was highlighted as one of four model 
programs in the COPS document on Health, Safety and Wellness Case Studies in Law 
Enforcement, also utilizes individual program coordinators to oversee specific aspects of 
their safety and wellness programs, such as a full-time certified athletic trainer assigned 
to the academy.277 The program handles response to bloodborne pathogen exposures, 
coordinating follow up with medical practitioners, and manages the respiratory protection 
program through a coordinated partnership with the County’s Occupational Health 
Center. 
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Despite the wide range of safety programs identified nationally through 
Destination Zero, the study cannot be considered comprehensive in scope due to the 
small number of programs collected. This resulted from its reliance on the identification 
and collection of law enforcement safety programs through voluntary disclosure and 
participation. As such, the actual extent and type of safety programs in law enforcement 
cannot be determined. Project Destination Zero, however, still provides the best-
documented overview of law enforcement safety programs currently in existence. 
b. Below 100 
Below 100 is a national law enforcement safety program and non-profit 
organization that began in 2010 by a trainer with the International Law Enforcement 
Educators and Trainers Association (ILEETA) to reduce the number of line of duty 
deaths, especially those that were preventable. The mission and purpose of the program is 
to increase safety across the profession by having every level of the organization take 
responsibility for their actions regarding safety, and to reduce LODDs to less than 100 a 
year, a statistic not realized since 1943.278 The program was developed after law 
enforcement trainers reviewed thousands of LODD summaries and noticed trends in 
fatalities that were both predictable and preventable.279  
Areas that were targeted in the initial training course were those identified as 
within an officer’s control, and areas that data had shown were responsible for a high 
number of LODDs. These topics included seat belt usage, the wearing of body armor, 
response driving, and officer awareness and complacency. Content for the training 
continues to be modified to address other high-risk hazards that have negatively impacted 
the profession such as heart attacks, leading to the inclusion of training on officer health 
and fitness. This program is considered highly effective in targeting specific risk areas 
and has been recommended and endorsed by Graham, the aforementioned recognized 
expert in the police risk management field of study, Nationwide Insurance, and numerous 
state chiefs’ associations. 
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Many agencies have sent officers to participate in this training and have also 
adopted the Below 100 Safety Tenets to reinforce safety at all levels in the organization. 
Although this program has achieved wide endorsement across the profession, its value is 
limited to the specific areas of risk it targets and relies on the voluntary participation of 
agencies and officers.  
c. Training Safety Officer Program 
The Training Safety Officer (TSO) Program was developed by the League of 
Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust (LMCIT), in partnership with police and fire agencies 
across the state, to reduce training injures while maintaining realistic, quality training for 
its public safety professionals.280 The program utilizes dedicated safety officers for active 
training exercises, who provide “oversight, control and guidance,” while working closely 
with lead instructors, to ensure that the training is conducted professionally and with 
minimal risk to participants.281 The TSO Program is similar to that used by segments of 
the military, and involves assigning a trained and experienced instructor whose main 
responsibility is to provide a big-picture view of the scenario and to stop actions that are 
dangerous or unsafe.282  
In developing the TSO program, training staff members in Minnesota examined 
training injuries and cited a need to focus on “off-script behavior” during role-play 
scenarios.283 This was defined as any behavior not planned or listed in the lesson plan. 
To prevent these types of reactions in the training environment, instructors met in 
advance to try and determine what off-script reactions they might see in various 
scenarios. This proactive approach to scenario-based training equipped instructors with 
advance warning of what to look for, allowing them to stop the exercise before accidents 
or injuries occurred. 
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The TSO Program brought several valuable contributions to the scenario-based 
training environment, including the concept of a site assessment, to determine if the 
location of the scenario is safe for conducting the exercise; a safety plan that provides 
clear instructions on authority, instructor responsibilities, and emergency stop procedures 
when unsafe or dangerous acts occur; a mandatory safety briefing that is held prior to the 
start of any scenario for all instructors and participants; site inspections, to determine if 
proper controls are in place to secure “classroom” perimeters from outside interference 
and clear of unnecessary hazards; and a safety debriefing or critique, where instructors 
and participants discuss the results of the training session, lessons learned, and how 
future training can be improved through enhanced safety measures.284 
The TSO Program stresses the need to properly identify the TSO by the wearing 
of a reflective vest labeled for the safety officer’s role in the training scenario. This not 
only makes the TSO highly visible, but also reminds participants that they are being 
watched throughout the exercise.285 This is a similar protocol used by incident safety 
officers under ICS, who wear identifiable vests to designate their position and authority. 
TSOs function as the eyes and ears for the training, providing valuable feedback 
that instructors are often not in a position to witness, or simply cannot focus on due to 
other responsibilities. TSOs may witness role players acting off-script, officers getting 
frustrated and becoming overly aggressive with each other or with role players, 
participants leaving the controlled training environment and not checking back in with a 
safety officer, and the utilization of unsafe equipment for the scenario. As such, frequent 
and open communication between a TSO and the lead instructor is critical to identifying 
hazards during the execution of a scenario-based training session and ensuring a safe 
outcome. This ongoing communication process between the TSO and the lead instructor 
is commonly referred to as “looping” and is what makes the program effective.286 
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Although law enforcement has utilized safety officers in training for years, many 
have used them in name only, giving them little authority to safely conduct the exercise, 
and failing to involve them in the development of lesson plans or site assessments. The 
LMCIT’s TSO Program professionalized the process and changed the significance and 
involvement of safety officers in training, integrating them into the planning process and 
giving them more control over the execution of the training scenarios.287 The TSO 
Program has allowed law enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies to conduct effective, 
realistic training while using appropriate safety controls to minimize risk to participants 
and prevent accidents from occurring. 
d. Traffic and Vehicle Operation Programs 
A wide variety of different programs and approaches to increasing vehicle safety 
exist across the policing profession. Safety programs for traffic and vehicle operations 
have focused on targeted risk areas such as failure to wear seat belts, excessive speed, 
reckless driving behaviors, and failure to wear high-visibility vests while on foot 
investigating roadside accidents. Safety issues are addressed largely through in-service 
training programs, implementation of policies and regulations governing vehicle 
operations, educational campaigns aimed at changing driving behaviors and eliminating 
cultural barriers, and technological advances to monitor driving.  
Vehicle safety technologies, such as airbags and seatbelts, have reduced the 
number of vehicle fatalities. Research is also being conducted into the design and 
placement of equipment inside police vehicles to increase visibility and safety. 
e. Health and Wellness Programs 
The law enforcement profession has developed a wide range of health and 
wellness programs aimed at increasing officer safety from a physical and emotional 
standpoint, both on and off duty. Programs include on-duty physical fitness sessions, 
nutrition counseling, annual medical physicals and health screenings, suicide prevention 
and awareness, PTSD awareness, drug and alcohol counseling, and peer support 
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programs. Often these programs are voluntary as opposed to mandated, but each is 
intended to change individual health and wellness behaviors.  
In addition to service-based programs, agencies have launched educational 
initiatives and campaigns intended to bring awareness to health and wellness safety and 
highlight issues of concern with officers. Posters, newsletters, videos, websites, slogans, 
and logos have been developed by agencies to educate and emphasize the importance of 
engaging in positive health and wellness behaviors. Incentives have also been created by 
some agencies through the creation of competitions and personal awards to increase 
interest and participation in health and wellness programs. These incentives have 
included days off, monetary stipends, and awards. 
More progressive agencies have incorporated psychologists on staff who are 
trained in the mental health issues unique to the law enforcement profession. These 
mental health professionals fill a critical role in the agency and develop trusting 
relationships with officers over time, allowing for a more open and effective intervention 
when traumatic or stressful incidents occur. When officers have established relationships 
with mental health service providers, day-to-day access within their agencies, and the 
assurance of confidentiality, they are more likely to seek assistance. 
2. Fire Service Programs 
What sets the fire service apart from the law enforcement profession is the 
incorporation of safety-related programs, practices, and regulations that govern the entire 
profession. Safety programs have been developed to provide a comprehensive approach 
to firefighter safety through education and training, implementation of standards, and 
dedication of resources.  
a. National Fire Academy Safety Curriculum 
The firefighting profession has embraced safety as a core mission of its duties, 
dedicating safety resources to all aspects of operations and training. The Fire Service 
formally began to embrace safety in 1970 with the establishment of the National Fire 
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Academy and a training curriculum that included firefighter safety.288 The Academy 
teaches the concepts of priorities of fire and emergency decision-making, which 
emphasizes the fire or emergency is secondary to the safety of life at the scene of an 
incident.289 This emphasis on life safety is intended to reinforce sound decision-making 
during high-risk operations and prevent unnecessary loss of life. 
b. National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1500 
In the years that followed the opening of the National Fire Academy, formal 
mandates to regulate safety began to emerge in the profession. In 1985, a select group of 
fire chiefs developed the Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, a 
program designed to reduce firefighter line of duty fatalities and injuries. This document 
was later adopted by the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) and published in 
1987 as NFPA 1500. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) describes itself as 
“a global nonprofit organization established in 1896 devoted to eliminating death, injury, 
property and economic loss due to fire, electrical and related hazards.”290 NFPA 1500 
established a requirement for fire departments to have an occupational health and safety 
program in place.291 It was the “first consensus standard to address occupational safety 
and health for organizations delivering emergency services,” and identified specific goals 
and objectives to “reduce the occupational accidents, injuries, and fatalities facing 
firefighters.”292  
c. Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) established 
federal legislation in 1998 to address firefighter line-of-duty deaths and injuries. The 
Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program federally mandated 
investigations of firefighter deaths to determine the cause and assist in the prevention of 
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future incidents. These investigations are analyzed by engineers and fire chiefs and result 
in safety recommendations that are shared with over 25,000 career and volunteer fire 
departments across the country.293 
d. Incident Safety and Health Safety Officer 
More recently, the fire service has standardized their approach to safety through 
the development of the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) and the Health Safety Officer 
(HSO). NFPA 1521 “identifies the minimum job performance requirements (JPRs) 
necessary to perform the duties as a fire department health and safety officer and a fire 
department incident safety officer.”294 The incident safety officer position was created to 
ensure the safety, well-being, and accountability of all personnel, by monitoring 
operations and procedures, and identifying potentially hazardous situations. The role 
includes recognizing hazards, ensuring proper rest and rehabilitation of personnel, and 
developing site safety plans for extended operations. As James Smith points out, 
“monitoring of an incident by the ISO maintains a systematic safety analysis of the 
scene.”295 
ISOs are specially trained officers, as designated under the incident command 
system, who report directly to the incident commander. They have the authority to 
immediately stop operations and correct unsafe acts. ISOs are not considered experts in 
all areas of fire response and as a result, require assistance on more technical, complex 
incidents. In these instances, assistant safety officers who are trained in the specialized 
skill needed to resolve the incident are designated.296 Figure 5 illustrates the safety 
officer position within the formal incident command structure. 
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Figure 5.  Safety Responsibility in the Incident Command System 
 
Source: Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, M. Susan Ridgely, James T. Bartis, and Herbert 
I. Linn, Protecting Emergency Responder: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism 
Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 20.  
Health Safety Officers differ from ISOs in that they are trained to manage all 
health and safety programs throughout the entire department. HSOs oversee and 
coordinate safety in areas such as vehicle operations, training, respiratory protection, and 
equipment. HSOs are dedicated resources whose primary job is personnel health and 
safety on a day-to-day basis.  
3. Military Programs 
Various models of safety exist throughout the different branches of service within 
the military. What are common to each are their systematic and integrated approaches to 
safety, applying comprehensive frameworks to oversee operations and govern the 
behaviors of personnel in order to minimize the risk of injuries and accidents. This 
research did not evaluate all military programs, but focused on several that highlight the 
effective concepts and models being utilized, providing possible opportunities for 
applicability to the law enforcement profession.  
These models or programs represent different comprehensive strategies to include 
the implementation of safety and risk management systems (Crew Resource Management 
and Operational Risk Management), implementation of mandated policies and procedures 
to guide behavior (Army Safety Program), a review process to improve safety and 
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effectiveness during training and operations (After Action Reviews), and development of 
educational tools to reinforce safety both at home and at work (Readiness Through Safety 
Program). 
a. Crew Resource Management  
Crew Resource Management (CRM) was developed by the aviation industry to 
increase the effectiveness and performance of flight crews after human errors were 
identified as the leading cause in a series of accidents in the 1970s.297 CRM can be 
defined as “using all the available resources—information, equipment, and people—to 
achieve safe and efficient flight operations.”298 The concept can be first traced back to a 
NASA workshop in 1979 that examined psychological research into aviation 
accidents.299 CRM became a mandatory process for military flight crews to utilize in the 
1990s, and was instituted in the commercial airlines in 1998.300  
CRM comprises five factors: “communication, situational awareness, decision-
making, teamwork, and barriers, designed to keep minor human errors or oversights from 
escalating into a major accident.”301 The goals of CRM are “to minimize the effect that 
human error has on operations and maximize human performance.”302 CRM provides for 
better teamwork among crew members; equips crew members with new communication 
and problem solving skills; creates an operating environment where team member input 
is both welcome and expected, while maintaining legal authority; and contributes to the 
proactive prevention of workplace accidents.”303 
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Although listed as a military program, CRM has been adopted by other 
organizations including air traffic control, nuclear power industry, offshore oil industry, 
healthcare, and the fire service. With recent implementation in the fire service, law 
enforcement may discover a similar direct application for CRM to high-risk operations. 
Utilizing a similar decision-making process on joint operations will only enhance 
communication, teamwork, effectiveness, and safety for both agencies. 
b. Operational Risk Management  
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a risk management and decision-making 
tool for reducing the inherent risk in conducting military operations and increasing 
operational effectiveness. In his thesis on “Safety Risk Management for Homeland 
Defense and Security Responders,” Tommey Meyers describes the United States Coast 
Guard definition of ORM as  
a continuous, systematic process of identifying and controlling risks in all 
activities according to a set of pre-conceived parameters by applying 
appropriate management policies and procedures. This process includes 
detecting hazards, assessing risks, and implementing and monitoring risk 
controls to support effective, risk-based decision making.304  
ORM is built upon the risk management framework that implies measures to 
reduce the frequency of accidents can be identified, evaluated, and mitigated.305 ORM 
provides military commanders with the means to help define risk to personnel and 
resources and control it where possible. In military organizations, ORM has become a 
standard process to increase mission success in high-risk environments.306 It 
“incorporates four different principles: accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs, 
accept no unnecessary risk, anticipate and manage risk by planning, and make risk 
decisions at the right level.”307  
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The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was the first military organization to 
adopt ORM in 1999, after several major marine accidents resulted in the loss of life in the 
early 1990s.308 All other military branches of service developed and implemented ORM 
following the USCG’s implementation, for similar reasons. The “ORM process consists 
of five steps: hazard identification, risk assessment, analyze control measures, make 
control decisions, control implementation, and supervision.”309 Military commanders use 
ORM in various situations to include the planning phase of operations, the evaluation of 
new procedures or tactics, and when time critical risk decisions are required in battle.310 
Figure 6 illustrates the various steps in the ORM process. 
Figure 6.  Six-Step ORM Process 
 
Source: F Federal Aviation Administration, “Operational Risk Management.” In System 
Safety Handbook, Chapter 15: Operational Risk Management (ORM), 2000, 
(Washington, DC: FAA), p. 5. 
The ORM process has direct application to the high-risk environment of both law 
enforcement and the fire service, where critical decisions must be routinely made that 
                                                 




balance risk with mission accomplishment. The implementation of ORM in public safety 
could assist commanders and supervisors in reducing poor decision-making during high-
risk operations that leads to an increased risk of injuries and fatalities to personnel.  
c. After-Action Review  
After-action reviews (AARs) are a critical component of military safety programs, 
developed by the United States Army in the 1970s to provide detailed feedback to units 
on individual and collective performance and their relation to combat outcomes.311 In 
addition to a detailed analysis of combat outcomes and unit performance, the AAR also 
included the identification of areas requiring special attention to safety and training.312 
The Army’s development and use of the AAR process has led to a significant increase in 
the “Army’s capacity to learn and adapt continuously, while fostering an expectation that 
behaviors and decisions will be reviewed to enhance safety and minimize risk for future 
operations.”313  
AAR processes as practiced by public safety agencies nationwide are typically 
reflective or retrospective processes that look backward to determine why something 
happened. They represent “a one-time reflection event that happens only after a project is 
complete.”314 These processes are often disconnected from the action or exercise, and 
happen after the conclusion of the event. They frequently focus on developing 
recommendations to be implemented by people other than those making 
recommendations, are not shared or discussed with those affected by the 
recommendations, and involve little planning for future success.315 
In contrast to the AAR process conducted by public safety agencies, the U.S. 
Army AAR process is conducted throughout the life of an event, rather than after the 
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event is concluded. A valuable AAR process is concerned with future actions, not just 
reflection on what has happened. When identifying issues related to safety, examining 
how changes can be made in future actions can help to mitigate risk and 
prevent accidents and injuries. Figure 7 summarizes the main difference between the 
two types of AAR processes. 
Figure 7.   Two types of AAR Processes 
Source: Marilyn Darling and Charles Parry, “After-Action Reviews: Linking Reflection 
and Planning in a Learning Practice,” Reflections 3 (2001): 2. 
Research has shown that an AAR “works best if it is focused on the critical issues, 
done immediately after the action, is inclusive of the whole group, is accordance with a 
structured process, and leads back to action quickly.”316 The use of the AAR process 
promotes structured and purposeful dialogue where everyone’s input is valued, an 
important dynamic in organizations with a positive safety culture. Group discussion, 
reflection, and understanding of actions are all integral components of the AAR process, 
which should lead to “sharing of learning in a way that will accelerate the rate of 
organizational improvement and safety.”317  
316 Baird, Holland and Deacon. “Learning from Action,” 2–78. 
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d. Army Safety Program 
The United States Army has regulated safety through a comprehensive program 
known as the Army Safety Program. The program is a complex regulation outlined in an 
extensive, three-part document that provides guidelines and expectations for safety within 
the service organization. The regulation provides a holistic and detailed approach to all 
aspects of safety within the service organization, “prescribing Department of the Army 
(DA) policy, responsibilities, and procedures to safeguard and preserve Army resources 
worldwide against accidental loss.”318  
The regulation addresses “general Army Safety Program management 
functions necessary for sustaining all phases and operations of the Army, whether at the 
garrison, in contingency operations, or wartime conditions; those special Army Safety 
Program management functions that are specific to supporting soldiers during training, 
mobilization, tactical, and field operations in the garrison or during contingency and 
wartime conditions; and safety functions supporting the garrison and industrial base.”319 
The Program further prescribes that federal and state OSHA-mandated programs are 
implemented, and equipment standards are applied, to all Army operations to reduce the 
risk of accidents, injuries, and occupational illness.320 
The Army Safety Program mandates the filing of safety investigation accident 
reports, many of which are used for the sole purpose of accident prevention. These 
reports, and the protected documents contained in the reports such as witness statements, 
are “prohibited from being used as evidence in any disciplinary, administrative, or legal 
action such as determining misconduct of Army personnel or liability in claims against 
the government.”321 This encourages the honest reporting of accidents in the workplace 
and provides a valuable database of lessons-learned to assist in the prevention of future 
accidents. 
                                                 





e. Readiness through Safety Program
The U.S. Army also developed a user-friendly website dedicated to safety for 
military members and their families, titled Readiness Through Safety.322 The website 
contains extensive information on safety in a variety of areas such as military training and 
tactics, vehicle operations, accident reporting and investigations, and aviation. 
Information on the website is also presented for the families of military personnel on 
topics such as home safety, sports and recreation, fire prevention, and safety for kids. The 
information is presented through a variety of different interactive resources such as 
toolkits, online training programs, articles, videos, and information papers.  
The Army’s focus on safety is reinforced on the website by leadership through 
messages from various unit leaders. Seasonal safety campaigns are also conducted and 
released every two years, and are intended to “promote individual responsibility and 
engagement on all fronts to help prevent fatalities and injuries throughout the year.”323 
4. Private Industry Programs
Private corporations have long recognized the need for safety in their operating 
environments, especially in industries such as manufacturing, chemical, nuclear, and 
aviation. As in the policing profession, these organizations require specialized equipment, 
training, policies and practices, and a strong culture of safety to minimize risk of injuries 
and fatalities in the workplace. Private industry sectors that have experienced high rates 
of accidents have responded proactively to address safety and prevent incidents from 
occurring, by recording, documenting, and analyzing patterns of accidents and 
injuries.324 
Not all private industry safety programs can be directly translated and applied to 
police organizations, however, due to the unique environments that each operate in. 
Many private sector safety prevention programs have proven to be successful, but have 
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not been considered, tested, or implemented in law enforcement agencies.325 Others have 
drawn criticism for their proclivity to create underreporting of injuries. 
a. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standards 
An evaluation of private sector safety programs revealed industries that are 
heavily regulated by federal laws and mandates through the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), which is “responsible for developing and enforcing 
workplace safety and health regulations.”326 The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
was created in 1970 and includes specific sections that address safety programs and 
responsibilities in the workplace.327  
OSHA standards have a significant influence over safety practices implemented in 
private industry, especially in the chemical and manufacturing sectors. While this act has 
authority over federal law enforcement agencies and the military, its safety and health 
regulations do not apply to state and local law enforcement agencies.328 States, however, 
are permitted to adopt OSHA regulations within their own regulatory framework, and 
OSHA must approve all state programs. These regulations must be as strict as federal 
OSHA regulations, and do apply to state and local employees. 
Public safety organizations generally fall into the general industry category, 
which includes a broad range of safety and health regulations.329 Regulations in this 
category applicable to the policing profession include standards for labeling hazardous 
chemicals, wearing personal protective equipment, respiratory protection, and handling 
bloodborne pathogens.330 
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b. Behavioral-Based Safety Programs 
Behavioral-based safety programs lead the field in private industry. They focus 
attention on the unsafe behaviors of employees and place responsibility for workplace 
safety directly on the worker rather than on workplace conditions.331 E. Scott Geller 
states that programs in this category “consist of employee training regarding safe and at-
risk behaviors, systematic observation and recording of the targeted behaviors, and 
feedback to workers regarding the frequency of safe vs. at-risk behavior.”332  
An example of a private sector behavioral-based safety program that has proven 
to be a model for safety practices in the private industry is DuPont’s STOP Program. The 
Stop Program’s objective is to “teach safety auditing skills, so supervisors and employees 
can observe workers who are performing normal work activities, reinforce safe work 
practices, and correct unsafe acts and conditions.”333 This philosophy is shared in other 
private sector behavioral-based safety programs such as Aubrey Daniels International 
(ADI), whose approach is to work toward ensuring that employees at all levels of the 
organization “form a partnership of responsibility for creating and maintaining a safe 
workplace.”334  
The behavioral-based approach can create problems when both employees and the 
environment contribute to workplace accidents and injuries. Behavioral-based programs 
have also drawn opposition from unions who advocate instead for safety programs “that 
enlist the skill, knowledge and commitment of the workforce in finding and correcting 
hazards.”335 
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c.  Incentive-Based Safety Programs 
Incentive-based programs are similar to behavioral-based safety programs and are 
designed to steer employee behavior toward increased safety practices through workplace 
rewards.336 Incentives are categorized as either extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic incentives 
are tangible rewards that often come in the form of bonuses, gift certificates, or extra 
vacation time.337 These motivators can be counterproductive, as workers fail to develop a 
personal frame of reference for safety, instead focusing simply on the economic benefits 
of the reward.338 If the reward is considered out of reach, employees may not even 
change safety-related behaviors. Conversely, “intrinsic incentives have no explicit value, 
but are linked to the emotional need to feel appreciated.”339 Examples of intrinsic 
incentives include public recognition or monthly safe employee awards. They are 
considered more effective in embedding safety as a positive cultural norm in 
organizations 
Critics of incentive-based safety programs argue that these programs actually 
discourage workers from reporting injuries. OSHA has expressed growing concern for 
workplace use of incentive-based safety programs that offer bonuses and other rewards 
for employees or teams of employees that achieve a certain number of hours without an 
injury.340 Despite laws to protect employees who report injuries and accidents or submit 
workers’ compensation claims, these types of programs have led to widespread 
underreporting of near-miss incidents, accidents, and injuries throughout industry 
because of fear of reprisal or humiliation.341 Underreporting is even more prevalent when 
teams are involved, as employees will hide injuries and accidents to avoid their entire 
team from missing out on a reward or bonus or succumb to peer pressure. OSHA 
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supports incentive programs that feature positive reinforcement for employees who 
demonstrate safe work practices and report close calls.342 
Employers may also have reasons for discouraging employees from reporting 
accidents and injuries. When injuries are not reported, workers’ compensation claims are 
not submitted, keeping employer insurance premiums and benefit costs low. The lack of 
reported injuries in private industry also assists employers in avoiding drawing attention 
from OSHA and being cited or fined. OSHA conducts “unannounced inspections of 
private industry workplaces when rates of employee injuries and illness reach a specified 
level.”343 
B. SUMMARY 
What has become clear after an examination of safety programs in law 
enforcement and in other high-risk organizations, is the lack of a coordinated, 
comprehensive approach to safety within the policing profession. Although law 
enforcement is making sincere efforts to target specific high-risk areas to reduce the 
number of injuries and fatalities, the manner in which this is being carried out is not 
systematic, nor is it coordinated or supported through national efforts. Missing are 
standards and regulations to guide safety management, training programs to educate 
agencies on effective safety and risk management, and a culture that prioritizes and 
supports efforts to enhance safety. 
In the next chapter, an analysis of research findings is conducted and numerous 
issues identified that impact the ability to effectively manage safety in the law 
enforcement profession. These issues will be discussed and used to formulate the basis 
for recommendations in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS  
The purpose of this research was to examine effective safety programs and 
practices in high-risk organizations, with the goal of recommending a comprehensive 
law-enforcement safety management system. In comparing the practices of other 
organizations to current law enforcement efforts, numerous gaps and deficiencies were 
identified in the profession’s approach to manage safety. To effectively address the 
research question, a comprehensive examination of these gaps was conducted, and 
several recommendations are offered to address them. 
This research has confirmed there are significant gaps in the collection of injury 
and accident data. It has also identified there is no systematic, coordinated or 
comprehensive approach to safety management within law enforcement, nor is effective 
training available to guide safety management efforts. These failures are large and drive 
the lack of focused attention to other areas of safety across the profession. While 
identifying creative and effective efforts to address safety in specific, targeted areas, this 
research has concluded that the law enforcement profession falls short of incorporating a 
holistic approach to safety across all areas of risk, leaving gaps that contribute to 
preventable injuries and accidents.  
The issues identified represent substantial deficiencies that must be addressed 
globally by the profession, and institutionalized by individual agencies, in order to effect 
positive change in organizational safety. Recommendations and solutions offered should 
incorporate comprehensive strategies to address each deficiency. Failure to do so will 
result in a continued pattern of repeated mistakes and missed opportunities to prevent 
accidents, injuries and fatalities, and impede efforts to increase safety within the 
profession. 
Specific issues identified include 
• failure to take a systems approach to safety management 
• lack of dedicated safety personnel  
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• lack of education programs for senior management and rank and file 
officers on Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management  
• lack of a national mandate and reporting system for accidents and injuries 
• lack of safety regulations and standards  
• lack of a mandated and standardized AAR format and process  
• failure to incorporate occupational health and safety as a discipline in the 
law enforcement profession 
A. FAILURE TO TAKE A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
Despite the recent focus on improving safety through the implementation of 
various programs and initiatives, the law enforcement profession has neglected to adopt a 
comprehensive safety management system or risk management model to ensure oversight 
of all facets of operations, training, and routine day-to-day tasks. The current, piecemeal 
approach of addressing safety through individualized programs that target specific risks, 
has led to gaps in safety within agencies, resulting in preventable injuries and fatalities. 
This was most recently recognized in a report by COPS, which found a “pattern of 
programmatic fragmentation in the way police agencies address health and safety 
issues.”344 The COPS report also supported the findings of this research by stating “a 
comprehensive, holistic framework is needed that helps police agencies organize their 
efforts and gauge their progress in tackling all agency health, safety and wellness 
needs.”345 
In contrast, a systems approach to safety “takes a broader view of what went 
wrong in the organization to allow the accident to take place, as opposed to focusing 
solely on the behavior of the employee involved.”346 In a systems approach, accidents are 
not viewed as chains of directly related failed events or human errors. Instead they 
consider accidents as “arising from the interactions among system components, not a 
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single casual factor.”347 This approach is a radical departure for police agencies, which 
seek to assign individual blame and discipline for every duty-related mistake or accident. 
Although internal investigations must occur to ensure accountability and address 
deficiencies, developing a system to run parallel accident investigations to evaluate the 
incident from a safety and risk management standpoint is suggested, to determine if 
factors outside employee behavior have a causal link to the incident. 
The NLEOMF’s recent study, Destination Zero, supported this research by 
revealing the lack of a comprehensive safety management system in the law enforcement 
profession. Although effective individualized safety programs were identified through the 
study, only one agency sought to coordinate safety across multiple risk areas and between 
units within the organization. No agency demonstrated the common components or 
organizational functions that comprise a recognized safety management system. 
The need for a comprehensive approach to safety has previously been identified 
by BJA and PERF, who stressed the need for comprehensive and proactive health and 
safety management day-to-day, rather than in reaction to incidents or in response to 
emergency situations.348 The PERF report, the most detailed and comprehensive source 
located during this research, proposed a comprehensive OHS framework identifying a 
three-part approach to officer safety: knowledge, control and prevention, and 
maintenance and improvement.349 The PERF report developed detailed checklists to 
assist law enforcement agencies in addressing OHS issues within their organizations. In 
accordance with my findings from the Destination Zero study, PERF found that while 
elements of this framework were evident in many state and local law enforcement 
agencies, no consistent, comprehensive framework has been adopted within the 
profession. Instead, specific health and safety programs have been “implemented in a 
“piecemeal fashion” in reaction to emerging threats, legal mandates, or social 
pressure.”350  
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Research conducted by Cooper in the UK on the management of occupational 
health and safety in the emergency response services also found that individual elements, 
such as specific programs in targeted risk areas, do not represent a comprehensive safety 
management system, instead “representing an incongruent behavior and attitude toward 
occupational health and safety.”351 The RAND/NIOSH report further indicated that 
safety risk management should be an integrated approach that meets the needs of 
response by “embedding safety risk management into organizations’ standard operating 
procedures.”352 
An effective approach to law enforcement injury prevention and risk mitigation 
requires the employment of a safety management system that allows agencies to conduct 
safety practices in a manner that is structured, coordinated across the entire agency, and 
integrated into the organization’s actions and decision-making. Research strongly 
supports the development and implementation of a comprehensive safety management 
system to oversee and coordinate safety across high-risk organizations. 
B. LACK OF DEDICATED SAFETY PERSONNEL  
Dedicated safety personnel are needed to “establish safety-related goals, policies 
and practices, and to ensure that organizational standards on agency-wide issues are 
disseminated and understood by all employees.”353 The coordination of safety-related 
practices across the organization is often absent when individual programs are 
implemented targeting only specific areas of risk, and no entity is tasked with 
coordination among the various components, as has been the practice throughout the law 
enforcement profession.  
Out of the 97 programs studied in the initial phase of Destination Zero, only one 
had full-time, dedicated “safety officer” personnel that focused on a range of targeted risk 
areas within the law enforcement agency.354 Although notwithstanding the need for 
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additional improvement in its approach, the Fairfax County Police Department’s Safety 
Officer Program stands alone in this category. Only one other department identified in the 
study, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (FL), proved innovative and comprehensive in 
its approach within a targeted risk area, dedicating a permanent coordinator to oversee 
wellness. In addition, many agencies did not have performance measurements to 
determine the effectiveness of the safety programs they had in place.  
Also identified in this research is the absence of dedicated safety resources to 
high-risk law enforcement operations, such as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) position 
developed and incorporated into operational response by the fire service. Only one 
agency identified in the Destination Zero study deployed safety officer personnel to high-
risk operational incidents. Law enforcement response to complex, high-risk operations 
such as hostage-rescue incidents, barricaded subjects, active shooter, and explosive 
ordnance incidents, demands the utilization of dedicated and trained safety resources to 
oversee the safety of personnel during the incident. This is especially critical in large-
scale, complex events involving multiple units or agencies, and those that extend into 
multiple operational periods, requiring the formal utilization of the incident command 
structure. In these scenarios, incident commanders focus their attention on eliminating the 
active threat and stabilizing the incident, while safety officers provide the incident 
commander with trained resources focused solely on implementing safety protocols to 
mitigate risk to personnel involved in the response operation. 
Trained and experienced safety experts are a necessary component of any safety 
program within high-risk organizations. Safety professionals develop a comprehensive 
view of the safety issues confronting an agency, connecting dots, and addressing gaps not 
visible to individual units. Although not considered specialists in all areas of the 
profession, they work in coordination with technical experts, such as training safety 
officers and other OHS professionals, to ensure that effective safety practices are 
implemented in programs, tactics, and equipment. These experts also work with technical 
experts to “investigate and analyze work-related accidents for root cause and trends, 
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evaluate and recommend new equipment and processes to address safety concerns, and 
manage communications regarding safety-related issues throughout the organization.”355  
Dedicated safety officer personnel also play a critical role in managing 
communications when safety-related issues arise that create fear and concern within law 
enforcement agencies, such as the recent 2015 Ebola outbreak that carried potential 
impact to first responders. During this health crisis, law enforcement agencies that had no 
safety or occupational health programs or personnel in place were left to rapidly seek out 
expert guidance to assist in developing safe response protocols, which created delays in 
communicating recommendations to officers. 
Safety officers proactively work to develop valuable relationships with other 
health care professionals to gain insight on issues affecting the occupational health and 
wellness of employees, and act as agency liaisons when issues arise requiring outside 
expertise. This also exposes safety experts to effective policies and practices utilized in 
other fields that may be considered for application in the law enforcement profession. In 
addition, by developing relationships and partnerships with outside health and wellness 
providers, agencies can establish access to components of OHS programs without having 
to develop these resources internally, reducing management and staffing costs. 
The Toronto (Canada) Police Service’s successful handling of the SARS outbreak 
in 2003 serves as an example of a law enforcement agency’s ability to manage 
communications involving a serious occupational health crisis. The department’s OHS 
Unit played a critical role in preventing the spread of the SARS disease through the 
organization by “providing regular interaction and timely information updates on risk 
management and risk tolerance strategies.”356 The OHS Unit was also able to “quickly 
address and discount rumors and false information that was being circulated by the 
media, which helped to dissipate fear and concern through the organization, allowing 
officers to focus on their public safety mission.”357 
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Numerous factors should be considered when determining whether safety officer 
resources should be dedicated as full-time positions. The size and complexity of an 
agency and the number of different units and physical locations in the organization 
should be considered when evaluating whether full-time resources should be appointed. 
Smaller agencies located in one location can equally benefit from having safety officers 
serve in supplemental positions, due to the lack of complexity and ease of coordination 
within the agency. Supplemental safety officers should, however, devote full attention to 
the organizational function for which they serve whenever safety resources are needed.  
C. LACK OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
AND RANK AND FILE OFFICERS ON OHS MANAGEMENT 
Research of educational programs and professional training curriculum for law 
enforcement commanders and senior management reveals little emphasis or content 
regarding occupational safety and health. An examination of established national 
executive level programs for law enforcement leaders such as the FBI’s National 
Academy, PERF’s Senior Management Institute, and the Southern Police Institute’s 
Chief Executive Leadership Course found no comprehensive or dedicated focus on 
occupational health and safety, although curriculum often includes limited topics 
regarding risk management and liability. The lack of OHS content in formal education 
programs at the national level sends the message that safety is not a priority for law 
enforcement senior leadership to address.  
Workshops, websites, training aids, and educational documents have been 
developed in the past several years by law enforcement professional organizations such 
as the IACP, COPS, PERF, and BJA, addressing a variety of safety initiatives for law 
enforcement agencies of all size. Formal curriculum in national command schools and 
training academies, however, has yet to prioritize safety and develop content focusing on 
the development of effective safety management practices and a positive safety culture. 
Although the Below 100 Program is available to officers throughout the country, and has 
been endorsed by many agencies, its ability to impact safety culture and change behavior 
is minimal without the continued support and institutionalization of the programs safety 
tenets by law enforcement organizations. 
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Leadership prioritization, support of safety management programs, and effective 
modeling of safety-related behaviors were previously identified as critical elements in 
achieving a positive safety culture within agencies. Without education and training 
regarding the need to develop a systematic and focused approach to safety, and methods 
to implement agency-wide OHS and risk management programs into day-to-day 
operations, law enforcement leaders will continue to approach safety in a reactive 
manner, missing opportunities for risk mitigation and prevention. The lack of a focused 
and proactive approach to safety by leadership also reinforces the existing culture within 
law enforcement that accepts all risk as part of the job, leading to preventable accidents 
and injuries. 
The absence of training for safety officers and safety management practices 
implies a lack of importance and priority for the profession. Despite an emphasis on 
improving safety and the development of various safety programs in targeted risk areas, 
safety management and safety officer training courses have not been developed for the 
law enforcement profession. This void stands in stark contrast to the development of 
certification courses and institutionalization of the safety officer position in the fire 
service. As a result, law enforcement agencies are left to develop informal or untested 
approaches to improve safety that lack a recognized, systematic methodology or training 
curriculum across the profession, leaving gaps in oversight and coordination.  
One exception to this tendency of not addressing safety concerns in a standardized 
manner is the TSO Program that was developed for instructors to reduce risk in scenario-
based training. With the growing demand for law enforcement agencies to develop and 
conduct scenario-based training to more effectively exercise de-escalation techniques, 
especially during encounters with emotionally disturbed individuals, comes an increase in 
risk to participants. The utilization of formally trained TSOs to conduct scenario-based 
training will be critical to preventing accidents and injuries in the training environment. 
The law enforcement profession could make significant strides in developing a 
safety officer curriculum by examining safety officer training in the fire service, both at 
the line and senior management level. Relevant safety-related practices and protocols 
could be adapted for and applied to the law enforcement environment. Developing safety 
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response protocols consistent with the fire service could also enhance coordination on 
incidents involving joint public safety response.  
A study of safety-related practices in private industry would also provide law 
enforcement with new ideas and practices that could prove useful in developing 
innovative safety programs and practices within the profession. A certification course 
could then be developed utilizing effective practices and protocols from other 
organizations, and supported by professional groups such as the IACP, and offered as a 
standard for addressing risk management and managing safety within law enforcement 
agencies.  
D. LACK OF A NATIONAL MANDATE AND REPORTING DEPOSITORY 
FOR INJURIES AND ACCIDENTS 
The lack of a national reporting mandate for law enforcement line-of-duty injuries 
and accidents remains problematic. This gap was most recently identified by the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, which called for “the establishment of a 
nationwide repository of data on law enforcement injuries, deaths, and near misses.”358 
Effective risk management policies and practices cannot be developed to address 
deficiencies both within individual agencies and throughout the profession without 
detailed data on the number and type of injuries sustained. Lack of data also inhibits the 
ability to determine whether safety and risk management programs implemented have 
had a positive effect on reducing injuries and accidents in the workplace, or whether the 
introduction of new equipment or technologies is enhancing safety or exposing officers to 
additional risks. 
Due to the vast number of independent law enforcement agencies nationwide 
(over 18,000), the establishment of a nationwide repository for injuries and accidents is 
not likely to occur without mandated regulations or federal legislation. Despite their 
proven value in saving lives, even mandatory wear policies for bulletproof vests did not 
become institutionalized among law enforcement agencies until the past decade, when the 
awarding of grant funding was tied to having such policies in place. 
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There is also significant concern among law enforcement leadership regarding 
how mistakes or failures will be communicated and shared publicly, and the impact of 
potential retribution. These fears are enhanced due to the media’s highlight of problems 
and their focus on assigning blame. As Husted and Michailova observed, “individuals do 
not freely and openly share knowledge about the mistakes they have made.”359  
Many law enforcement agencies do not freely share accident and injury data and 
investigative details outside of their organization. Leaders often do not take responsibility 
for failures due to concerns regarding retribution and liability, and reports that are 
produced may omit pertinent information to shield individuals from potential negative 
impact. There is often a fear that leaders might blame those who are involved in failed 
response operations or workplace accidents and react to these failures by punishing 
them.360 These fears and perceptions permeate the public safety culture and interfere with 
accurate and effective reporting processes. 
A regulation to mandate nationwide injury and accident reporting for law 
enforcement agencies is needed to compel organizations to provide this data. The 
knowledge that they will be required to provide detailed information on accidents and 
injuries to a nationwide depository may also motivate some agencies to proactively make 
changes in safety protocols before an incident happens.  
E. LACK OF REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS FOR SAFETY 
What has set the fire service, military, and other high-risk organizations in private 
industry apart from law enforcement regarding safety management has been the 
establishment of standards and regulations to govern behavior, operations, and reporting. 
Although gaps and safety challenges still exist in these organizations, especially 
regarding safety culture, the establishment of industry-wide standards and regulations 
enacted to govern safety practices and policies have assisted in achieving a coordinated 
effort and expectation of behavior throughout the respective professions. These 
regulations are often legislated, as through OSHA, and through specific industry 
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standards developed for worker protection and safety. In the fire service, standards 
compel the reporting of accidents and injuries through several different national 
databases, contributing to the profession’s ability to conduct effective risk assessment and 
enact preventative measures. 
Even without safety standards and regulations to govern the profession, safety 
management certification programs developed and supported by national law 
enforcement professional organizations could significantly increase agency participation. 
Developing such programs in conjunction with state and local government insurance 
providers could provide motivation for agencies to participate, possibly leading to 
reduced insurance premiums and increased participation rates. This approach is not 
entirely uncommon in other areas within the law enforcement profession, as agencies 
voluntarily participate in certification programs for crime prevention for example, as well 
as state and national accreditation programs, to achieve recognition, maintain currency on 
best practices, and increase operational effectiveness. 
F. LACK OF A MANDATED AND STANDARDIZED AAR FORMAT AND 
PROCESS 
Across law enforcement, there are no universally accepted formats or approaches 
to the development or content of AAR documents, a standard requirement to produce 
them, or enough trained personnel to effectively lead and administer the process.361 Some 
reports produced are comprehensive and provide useful and insightful recommendations, 
while others fail to be detailed enough to provide even general guidelines for 
improvement. Agencies also vary in their requirement to even produce such reports, or 
have personnel trained to effectively moderate the process.362  
Research cites numerous problems with the current AAR process utilized by 
public safety agencies, which “supports the cycle of repeated mistakes and leaves 
questions as to the value of such documents and their impact on correcting behaviors and 
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improving safety and response efforts for future events.”363 Law enforcement’s 
utilization of AARs over the past decade involving major events have largely identified 
core issues, including those surrounding safety, but little evidence exists that agencies 
have learned from these failures or affected the necessary policy and strategic changes to 
break the cycle of repeated mistakes.  
Despite research findings supporting the failure of AARs to produce effective and 
safety-minded change in response protocols and strategies, one example stands out as an 
exception within public safety. The lessons learned from the Columbine High School 
shootings were widely publicized and distributed among public safety agencies 
nationwide, resulting in rapid changes in law enforcement and EMS tactical response for 
active shooter incidents.364 The reasons cited for the effective changes in law 
enforcement response to such incidents involve “widespread public outcry and fear, the 
Columbine Police Department’s willingness to take responsibility for the mishandling of 
the response, and the rapid dissemination of new protocols to public safety agencies 
nationwide to handle similar incidents in the future.”365 The Columbine incident 
reinforces the critical need to develop an effective AAR process to share lessons learned 
in order to develop more effective and safe response protocols and mitigate risk in the 
workplace. It also offers promise for other safety-related changes needed within the 
profession. The application of a standardized process and format for after-action 
reporting would assist in capturing consistency of information relating to safety across 
multiple agencies and disciplines, as well as from different types of incidents.  
G. FAILURE TO INCORPORATE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY AS A DISCIPLINE 
Widespread research has been conducted on occupational health and safety, safety 
management, risk management, safety culture, and safety intervention practices in high-
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risk organizations. Much of this research is empirically supported by other disciplines 
and holds promise for application in the law enforcement profession. Despite this, the law 
enforcement profession has neglected to collaborate with safety professionals and OHS 
experts in these organizations and industries, or capitalize on the existing experiences, 
practices and research of safety and health management programs outside the profession 
that have proven strategies to effectively mitigate risk and reduce occupational injuries 
and accidents.  
Law enforcement has traditionally operated and trained in isolation, due to its 
unique environment and nature of duties. Training and response to identified problems 
have largely been developed internally, without partnerships or assistance from outside 
experts in other fields, due to an attitude within the profession that it has unique problems 
and issues that cannot be understood by or applied to other disciplines. The nature of the 
profession has also been to react to problems, not proactively address them. Safety 
management, however, requires a proactive approach to mitigate risk in the workplace 
and reduce the number of preventable accidents and injuries. 
The need to incorporate occupational safety and health into operational response 
was recognized by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
and the Rand Corporation in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as they 
collaborated to address issues relating to the safety of first responders during 
operations.366 Their report, Protecting Emergency Responders, Vol. 3, Safety 
Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response, discusses how to develop a safety risk 
management approach for first responders that improves safety and effectiveness.367  
H. SUMMARY 
With the identification of numerous issues affecting law enforcement’s ability to 
manage safety effectively, come opportunities to pose recommendations for 
improvement. The next chapter proposes solutions moving forward, the most important 
being the implementation of a recommended safety management framework for law 
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enforcement agencies. The framework was developed as a flexible model that can be 
adapted to agencies of any size and implemented without significant cost or extra 
resources. Law enforcement agencies can make significant strides in enhancing officer 
safety by fully implementing a safety management system within their organization. 
Other recommendations to improve safety are more complex and will require national 




VII. DEVELOPING A SOLUTION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Widespread and meaningful improvements in law enforcement safety will require 
efforts by both individual law enforcement agencies and national police organizations, 
which have the ability to coordinate, mobilize, and drive priorities within the profession. 
While the majority of recommendations proposed require attention from the national 
level, the first recommendation offers an opportunity for agencies to begin the process of 
mitigating risk with the goal of reducing accidents and injuries. Adopting and 
implementing the proposed safety management model will allow agencies to take a 
proactive approach to managing safety throughout their organization. Recommendations 
proposed include the 
• development and adoption of a standardized safety management system 
for law enforcement 
• development of standardized OHS and risk-management training for both 
senior leadership and rank and file officers 
• creation of a comprehensive, national survey regarding safety 
management practices across the profession 
• development of a national mandate and reporting depository for injuries 
and accidents 
• development of a standardized format for after-action review reports and 
training to conduct AAR processes 
1. Development and Adoption of a Standardized Safety Management 
System for Law Enforcement 
This safety management system model is a synthesis of the common components 
of effective safety management systems located during this research. The framework 
consists of hazard identification; risk assessment; programs, standards, and practices; 
performance metrics and reporting; and audit and evaluation. Its development is based on 
academic research regarding safety management systems and applied theory relating to 
systems thinking, and provides a comprehensive and flexible system for law enforcement 
agencies of any size to effectively identify and manage risk. The focus of this safety 
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management model is on areas of risk and behavior in which officers and agencies have 
significant control, but the model can also be expanded to threats such as ambush and 
terrorist attacks, which are often unforeseen and unpreventable. 
The model delineates specific functions under each component, but leaves 
discretion for agencies on how to carry out each function. As such, it does not describe 
the specific tasks, procedures, policies or programs under each safety system component. 
The specifics of these should be defined by the individual agency based on its 
organizational structure, budgetary constraints, and resources. The successful 
implementation of this model, however, is entirely dependent on the priority police 
leaders place on safety within their organizations. Following the illustration of the model 
in Figure 8. is a brief description of each main component. 




a. Hazard Identification 
Hazards that affect an organization must first be identified before any risk 
assessment can be conducted. The Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety 
defines a hazard as “any source of potential damage, harm or adverse health effects on 
something or someone under certain conditions at work.”368 Many definitions throughout 
literature recognize the identification of hazards as the first step in any formal risk 
assessment process. Hazards can originate from both internal and external sources, and 
both should be closely examined when identifying hazards within the law enforcement 
profession.  
An effective hazard identification process should identify every type of harm 
present in the workplace.369 This should be a collaborative process involving 
representatives from each area of the organization to ensure a comprehensive review of 
agency operations and functions. The specific hazards listed under the “hazard 
identification” component in this model can be expanded to include other areas of risk to 
law enforcement agencies, depending on agency priorities, needs, and threats.  
b. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a process that identifies the types of risks present in the 
workplace, evaluates the likelihood and severity of those risks, and develops appropriate 
measures to control or prevent the harm from occurring.370 Graham states that risk 
assessment involves the prioritization of identified risks in terms of frequency and 
severity.371 Determining how often an exposure to an identified risk may occur 
(frequency), and how damaging the exposure could be to employees and the organization 
(severity), allows a systematic method for prioritizing risks within the workplace.  
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Risk assessment should involve an understanding of how much risk is acceptable 
for each hazard identified. In the law enforcement profession, exposure to risk is accepted 
as part of the job, but restrictions are placed on officer response and behavior to control 
and mitigate the amount of risk officers face. Standards for acceptable risk for each 
hazard identified should be established and clearly communicated by agency leadership 
in any risk assessment process. 
When assessing the risk of the various hazards identified, numerous areas within 
the organization must be examined to determine their effect on the problem. These areas 
include written policies and regulations, equipment and technology, legal mandates that 
govern actions and procedures, staffing resources, and budgetary funds to support 
necessary change. 
Once hazards are identified, the following questions should be asked: 
1. What might go wrong? 
2. How can it happen? 
3. How likely will it happen? 
4. What are the possible consequences if it goes wrong? 
5. How can this hazard be controlled?372 
Developing a matrix or spreadsheet on each hazard identified, and answering the 
questions posed, will allow a thorough examination of the risks and establish a 
foundation for setting priorities and implementing control measures, the next step in the 
process. Many risk assessment tools are available for agencies that wish to engage in a 
more formal and structured process. 
c. Implementation of Programs, Standards, and Practices 
Once hazards have been identified and an appropriate risk assessment conducted, 
programs, practices, and standards must be implemented to control and mitigate the 
various hazards identified. Any program initiated should involve setting goals and 
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expectations for outcomes. Thorough planning should then be conducted that allows for 
the proper development of safety programs and practices. Programs and initiatives should 
be clearly communicated throughout the organization by leadership, and training and 
education provided where appropriate. Dedicated safety personnel should be appointed, 
whether as full-time positions or as supplemental units, and trained, to effectively carry 
out and oversee the coordination of safety management efforts across the organization.  
Safety-related programs are diverse and many creative and innovative efforts are 
being developed in law enforcement agencies nationwide. The development of a 
nationwide database for best practices to target specific areas of risk would allow 
agencies to search for programs that meet their needs and resources. Dedicated law 
enforcement safety personnel could also examine innovative ideas on safety initiatives 
and programs by developing relationships with OHS professionals in other fields, and 
applying those practices to the profession. 
d. Performance Metrics and Reporting 
For every safety program initiated, performance metrics should be developed to 
determine whether the program is having its intended impact. While the effectiveness of 
safety programs is not easily measureable, especially in law enforcement, establishing 
goals and determining benchmarks within data sets prior to the start of any new program, 
can provide critical intelligence to gauge progress and impact. Various data sources are 
used to evaluate whether safety programs initiated are achieving expected outcomes. 
These include workers’ compensation claims, injury and illness rates, and sick leave 
usage and are available to most agencies through their human resource department.  
Agencies should establish effective reporting mechanisms to document safety-
related issues. While internal investigations are necessary for officer accountability, 
parallel investigations of the incident for safety-related problems should be incorporated 
into agency practices to ensure that other factors beyond officer behavior are not 
contributing to the issue. Other procedures for reporting accidents or close calls should be 
clearly communicated to all employees and be non-punitive in nature. Results from all 
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incident-reporting mechanisms and after-action reviews should be fed back to all 
employees to enhance learning and assist in the future prevention of similar problems. 
e. Audit and Evaluation 
Audits are safeguards to ensure that safety goals are understood and given priority 
by employees and include such practices as inspection programs to review policies and 
written procedures, sampling employee behavior to determine compliance with agency 
standards, and surveys to examine the organization’s safety climate and employee 
attitudes. Audits help to determine whether the expected ways of safely performing 
organizational tasks are the actual way the tasks are being carried out. This is critical in 
the law enforcement profession, where professional cultural has been identified as having 
a negative effect on officer safety, often resulting in unnecessary risk taking and 
preventable injuries and accidents. 
f. Feedback 
The inability to learn from past mistakes has posed significant challenges for law 
enforcement, largely due to the absence of effective feedback from both internal and 
external sources. Within a system, feedback involves the “transfer and sharing of 
information from the various monitoring and auditing functions to users at all levels of 
the system.”373 Information that is developed from monitoring and auditing safety 
programs and behaviors within a SMS should be fed back into the system to drive 
changes and adjustments in policies, behaviors, or equipment.  
Critical to this SMS model is the incorporation of a feedback loop that can 
address issues at the technical (equipment), organizational (policies and procedures), or 
human (behavioral) level and provide solutions for corrective action and continuous 
improvement. Feedback can be gathered from almost any incident, evaluation, or 
monitoring process and can include deliverables such as incident reports that flag areas of 
concern and follow up, the sharing of after-action reports or incident debriefs, or surveys 
completed during the testing and evaluation of new equipment. Once feedback is 
                                                 
373 McDonald et al., “Safety Management Systems and Safety Culture,” 151–176. 
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obtained, it should be fed back into the risk assessment and policies, programs, standards, 
and practices component so that changes or adjustments can be made.  
2. Development of Standardized OHS and Risk Management Training 
for both Senior Leadership and Rank and File Officers 
Expectations for change must be accompanied by a plan to address training 
deficiencies and priorities. Standardized training courses need to be developed for both 
law enforcement leadership and for rank and file officers to provide the foundation on 
which to implement effective safety management practices.  
Law enforcement leaders should be educated on the extent of the safety problem 
within the profession, how to conduct a proper risk assessment, and how to implement a 
safety management system to manage and mitigate the risks identified. Courses for law 
enforcement safety officers also need to be developed and standardized to ensure agency 
personnel assigned to these functions are well educated on the most current practices to 
manage safety across the organization. Such courses could be adopted by national law 
enforcement professional organizations or state mandating authorities to provide support, 
creditability, and certification to safety management. The development of formal safety 
courses for law enforcement would demonstrate a prioritized, coordinated, and proactive 
effort to enhance safety across the profession. 
3. Creation of a Comprehensive, National Survey Regarding Safety 
Management Practices across the Profession 
Law enforcement needs more accurate information regarding current safety 
management practices across the profession to more effectively develop safety-related 
training and standards. The NLEOMF’s Destination Zero study cannot be considered 
comprehensive in scope, as it provided only a small sample of current safety programs 
and practices nationwide. Despite its exemplary efforts, the NLEOMF does not have 
sufficient communication channels or the professional influence to compel survey 
responses from the majority of law enforcement agencies.  
To gain widespread participation and response, it is recommended that the survey 
be conducted by the IACP’s Center for Officer Safety and Wellness and carefully 
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constructed to ensure the capture of the wide range of safety and risk management 
programs in existence. The IACP is the largest law enforcement professional organization 
in existence, with members both nationally and internationally. It has the ability to 
communicate and correspond with law enforcement agencies across the nation through 
the various police chief associations and criminal justice mandating authorities in each 
state.  
The information generated from this survey could then be evaluated to better 
determine gaps and provide direction on the development of effective programs and 
practices that make up the various components in a safety management system. A matrix 
comprised of best practices within targeted risk areas could then be constructed and 
shared with the profession to generate agency interest and participation, and assist 
agencies in more effectively managing safety and risk. It could also be used to develop 
training programs for law enforcement safety management. 
4. Development of a National Mandate and Reporting Depository for 
Injuries and Accidents 
A true understanding of the safety-related problems within the law enforcement 
profession cannot be achieved without a clear and detailed picture of the extent and type 
of all injuries, accidents, and fatalities occurring in the line of duty. A national depository 
for the reporting of injuries and fatalities is of critical importance and must be created 
through federal mandates to ensure compliance and consistency among the vast number 
of different local and state law enforcement agencies. 
The accomplishment of this task will likely require the support and proactive 
sponsorship of the IACP, the largest law enforcement professional organization in the 
world. Coordinating their legislative lobbying efforts nationwide with state police chief 
associations will provide political support at both the federal and state level. The 
inclusion of PERF, the Police Foundation, and other credible and highly influential law 
enforcement professional organizations could assist in garnering support. Highlighting 
the existence and effectiveness of mandatory reporting mechanisms in the fire service 
may also prove a valuable strategy for accomplishing this goal. 
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5. Development of a Standardized Format for After-action Review 
Reports and Training to Conduct AAR Processes 
Throughout law enforcement, there are no universally accepted formats for AAR 
documents. Those that are produced vary in their level of detail and usefulness, and are 
normally limited to major incidents. While some provide a thorough examination of 
issues and propose valuable recommendations, others fail to incorporate honest feedback 
or suggest areas for improvement. Even when practical and achievable recommendations 
are made, follow up is not always conducted to ensure changes are implemented in 
agency policies and procedures. 
The development of a standardized format for AAR reports and training on how 
to properly conduct an AAR process could provide the necessary platform and 
encouragement for agencies to adopt and institutionalize an AAR process for routine 
operations and major incidents. Valuable lessons are often lost for smaller incidents that 
happen frequently within an agency. Failing to use the AAR process on a consistent basis 
results in opportunities lost for agencies to incorporate ongoing learning processes into 
the organizational culture. Smaller, more isolated incidents offer agencies the regular 
opportunity to practice using the AAR process and institutionalize it as part of a learning 
system, as well as a tool to drive organizational change and performance. 
The addition of a standardized format for an AAR report could provide consistent 
reporting across agencies, create additional opportunities for agencies to identify 
problems and develop more effective safety and response protocols, move agencies closer 
to becoming learning organizations, and reduce the number of preventable injuries and 
fatalities within the profession.  
B. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
The vast number of independent law enforcement agencies across the country, 
over 18,000, has contributed to a lack of a focused and coordinated approach to safety in 
the profession. Agencies operate independently or within individual state criminal justice 
mandating authorities, leading to a wide range of different policies and practices. 
Priorities are vastly different for various police agencies, which are impacted by political 
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and budgetary concerns. State criminal justice regulatory authorities do not emphasize 
safety programs, and OSHA regulations only govern specific areas of law enforcement 
operations. Accreditation standards also differ from state to state, but even national 
standards through CALEA, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies, do not mandate the implementation of a comprehensive safety management 
system or the dedication of trained safety officer personnel.  
The development of national regulations and standards, certifications, and 
curriculum for training personnel and agencies on safety management strategies, could 
provide the necessary requirement and motivation for agencies to take a proactive 
approach to safety-related issues, increasing opportunities for prevention and mitigation. 
Any initiatives developed will likely fail, however, without the strong support from an 
influential national law enforcement professional organization such as the IACP. 
Finding resources to develop and implement safety, health, and wellness 
programs is a significant challenge in today’s economic climate of shrinking budgets. 
Depletions in personnel and programs, mandates for additional certifications in existing 
skills, and the impact of technology demands, have resulted in fewer opportunities for 
law enforcement agencies to implement new programs. Implement new programs 
becomes even more challenging when performance outcomes cannot be readily identified 
or achieved in a short time period, as is often the case with safety programs. BJA, COPS, 
and PERF have all recognized there is little information available on the economic value 
of OHS programs for law enforcement, making justification for resources an even greater 
challenge.374 Conducting targeted studies over time and building in performance metrics 
can assist in demonstrating the benefits of these programs to both agencies and 
mandating authorities.  
Lastly, the culture within law enforcement organizations continues to be 
problematic, contributing to a pattern of acceptable risk taking that leads to repeated 
injuries and accidents. Although the threats are varied and not all injuries and fatalities 
can be prevented, law enforcement continues to experience problems in similar areas, 
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suggesting that organizational culture plays a key role in failing to address safety-related 
deficiencies. Wholesale improvement in safety outcomes can only be achieved when law 
enforcement leadership can become educated on the need for positive change, instill 
safety as a core value across the organization, and model and require positive safety 
behaviors from all employees. 
Despite the challenges, law enforcement leaders can immediately begin to 
institute positive changes within their individual agencies by placing a priority on safety 
and implementing a system to manage safety across the organization. The proposed law-
enforcement safety management framework offers a viable option for agencies of any 
size to manage safety without adding significant resources, presenting a systematic and 
structured approach to identifying hazards, and developing measures to control and 
mitigate risk. Although national safety initiatives will need to be developed in the area of 
training and standards, law enforcement agencies can utilize the framework to begin the 
process of self-evaluation, identify gaps in safety oversight, and implement programs and 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The ability for law enforcement to incorporate meaningful change in safety 
management and reduce the number of injuries and fatalities remains a significant 
concern. A pattern of repeated mistakes from one incident to the next demonstrates the 
failure of current practices and processes to identify, govern, and correct deficiencies 
properly. Mechanisms and training programs are not in place to provide leadership with 
the proper skills to incorporate safety processes into law enforcement organizations 
effectively. Improvement in safety will require a substantial change in organizational 
culture, the implementation of a comprehensive safety management system, the training 
of law enforcement personnel in safety management practices, and a commitment to 
institutional learning. 
The law enforcement profession must approach future solutions to improving 
safety from a systematic framework, based on specific recommendations and best 
practices found to be effective in other high-risk organizations. Safety management 
processes must become institutionalized into routine and high-risk operations at all levels. 
Identifying, standardizing, and mandating safety processes can assist agencies in 
mitigating risk and reducing the number of injuries and fatalities.  
Meaningful solutions should be targeted to address challenges on the strategic and 
policy level, be supported by political and jurisdictional leadership, and lead to 
organizational learning and change. Without such an approach, agencies will continue to 
be compromised by preventable injuries and fatalities. This is a complex issue that will 
require significant change and collaboration across the entire profession, with input from 
a broad spectrum of disciplines, while challenging existing and deeply ingrained culture, 
strategies, and methods. 
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